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Abstract

Along with service in the Continental Army and Navy and the various state
militias, American patriots during the Revolutionary War had the option of sailing aboard
privateers, private ships authorized to attack British commerce during the war. Where
studies analyzing other military forces during the Revolution have been more nuanced,
scholars that have looked at privateering have either focused on its strategic effectiveness
during the conflict or merely written it off as a profit-driven phenomenon of maritime
plunder. Privateering played a role in the course of the Revolution to a degree, but more
importantly the practice was influenced by the ideological considerations that framed the
Revolution itself—considerations that are ignored when privateering is seen through the
eyes of the profit-narrative. While in part motivated by profit, privateering during the
American War for Independence can only be fully understood when placed in the context
of contemporary debates over liberty, republicanism, and identity. These debates
stretched across the range of actors involved in privateering, from the sailors crewing
privateer vessels to the merchants investing in privateer expeditions. This thesis will draw
upon existing literature on privateering, Revolutionary ideology, and original analysis of
primary source information including correspondence, government documents, and
individual narratives to place privateering within the broader framework of the
Revolutionary period. In doing so, it will add a more complex and multilayered approach
to privateering to place that scholarship alongside other studies of military phenomena
during the American Revolution.
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A NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCE QUOTATIONS
This thesis quotes extensively from sources and documents written in the
eighteenth century. Conventions on spelling and grammar were not standardized at that
time. For this thesis, all spelling and punctuation has been preserved as written. When the
meaning of the original writing is unclear, I have included the meaning in brackets.
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INTRODUCTION

It was the spring of 1772, and Lieutenant William Dudingston was one of the
most hated men in the colony of Rhode Island. The British Admiralty had given
Dudingston command of the schooner Gaspee, and charged him to prevent Rhode
Islanders from importing contraband into any of the ports in Narragansett Bay. That
contraband included French molasses and sugar, items that helped Rhode Islanders grow
their burgeoning distilleries. Dudingston stopped every vessel he encountered in the bay,
demanding to search their holds for contraband. His actions put a drain on imports into
the primary towns of Newport and Providence and were a slap in the face to Rhode
Islanders who resented any form of authority. Colonists complained that his commission
was “more of a fiction than anything else,” and even issued a warrant for his arrest. 1
By summer, the colonists were itching to get their hands on Dudingston. On June
9, they got their chance. While pursuing a packet boat owned by Captain Lindsey,
Dudingston ran the Gaspee aground.2 The tide was receding, leaving Dudingston
stranded until the early hours of the morning. Providence merchant and patriot John
Brown wasted little time in mobilizing the colonists, calling all interested participants to
gather at James Sabin’s house to prepare an assault on the beached British vessel. A
strange assortment of grizzled sea captains, roguish former privateersmen, raw wharf
hands and sailors, and well-to-do merchants infuriated with Dudingston’s activities

1

Deputy governor Darius Session to Governor Joseph Wanton, March 21 1772, in William R. Staples, The
Documentary History of the Destruction of the Gaspee (Providence: Knowles, Vose & Anthony, 1845), 3.
2
Some sources claim the owner of the packet was a Thomas Lindsey; see James B. Hedges, The Browns of
Providence Plantation, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 209. Other sources provide the
name of the owner as Benjamin Lindsey; see Charles Rappleye, Sons of Providence: The Brown Brothers,
the Slave Trade, and the American Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 107.
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arrived to take part in the excursion. Such was the excitement that Ephraim Bowen
claims men were “casting bullets in the kitchen.”3
That night a crowd of between sixty to eighty armed and angry colonists led by
Brown and former privateer captain Abraham Whipple rowed out to the stranded Gaspee.
As the colonists approached the ship Whipple called out, “I am the Sheriff of the county
of Kent, I am come for the commander of this vessel, and have him I will, dead or
alive.”4 While the two sides exchanged words Joseph Bucklin fired on the Gaspee,
striking Dudingston in the groin.5 The raiders stormed the vessel, and the distraught crew
surrendered. Brown ordered that nothing be taken from the vessel; he did not want the
authorities to trace anything back to the perpetrators.6 After ensuring that everyone was
off the vessel, the colonists set the ship aflame. They dropped the British sailors off on
shore and returned to their homes, leaving the Gaspee naught but a blackened hull burned
to the waterline.

*

*

*
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*

*

Account of Ephraim Bowen, in Staples, Documentary History, 8-9.
Account of John Mawney, in ibid. 9-10. Bowen claims Whipple said, “I am the sheriff of the county of
Kent, God damn you. I have got a warrant to apprehend you, God damn you; so surrender, God damn you”;
see Account of Ephraim Bowen, in ibid. 8. Sources disagree as to whether Abraham Whipple was actually
the sheriff of Kent, or frankly a sheriff of anywhere.
5
Account of Ephraim Bowen, in ibid. 8. In his account Bowen states that Bucklin, who was sitting next to
him, asked him, “Ephe, reach me your gun. I can kill that fellow [Dudingston].”
6
Most of the raiders followed Brown’s orders; however, one man was sighted in Newport the next day
“parading himself with Lieutenant Dudingston’s gold laced beaver on his head.” Quoted in Robert H.
Patton, Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution (New
York: Random House, 2008), 8.
4
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The Gaspee affair demonstrates the complex interplay between profit-based and
ideological motivations for conflict during the American Revolution. Was the attack on
the Gaspee motivated by profit? In a sense it was. Dudingston was halting the free flow
of trade in Narragansett Bay, stopping merchant ships and seizing cargo whenever he
thought something was amiss. The threat of capture may have encouraged some
merchants to shy away from dealing in contraband while Dudingston was present. But if
Dudingston was removed, trade could flow freely, and so could the profits.
But while there was personal gain to be had in removing Dudingston, particularly
for the merchants of Rhode Island, to say that the attack on the Gaspee was a purely
profit-driven affair is to ignore the place of the profit motive within the political, social,
and economic context of Anglo-American relations at the time. After the French and
Indian War the British imposed a series of new taxes on the American colonists, largely
taxing those in the mercantile sphere. Pamphlets throughout the colonies started to rail
against what they saw as British tyranny, and American colonists began to chafe under
Parliamentary rule. Isolated cases of violence had already broken out between the two
sides – in Narragansett Bay alone, colonists had fired on the British tender St. John in
1764, and had burned British longboats in 1765 and 1769. By the 1770s resentment of
British rule in the American colonies was at full boil.
Profit was a key component of the American Revolution. At one level, continued
existence under British rule was proving unprofitable to mercantile-minded colonists. But
that profit narrative was indelibly tied to wider ideological issues at play in the
Revolution. Cries of “taxation without representation” pointed both to the exasperating
increase in tax enforcement and the perceived injustice of Parliamentary rule without
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American colonial input. An increased British military presence both in the port cities
and along the coasts brought more restrictions on the (occasionally illicit) activities of
maritime merchants and the cherished civil liberties of American colonists. Resistance in
the commercial sphere from both the moneyed and working classes challenged Britain’s
commercial dominance of the colonies and, in turn, its political authority. The fact that
early resistance to British rule came from the profit-making spheres like maritime
commerce does not mean that the Revolution itself was profit-driven; rather, it suggests
an important connection between the acquisition of profit, the British commercialpolitical system, and the American colonists’ place within that system.
The importance of profit, commerce, politics, and identity in the Revolution can
best be seen in the widespread activity of privateers during that war. A privateer was a
private ship of war authorized with a letter of marque or commission by a legitimate
governing body to seize and plunder enemy vessels at sea. Privateers, in combination
with the new Continental Navy, made up the bulk of American forces at sea during the
War of Independence. It was a popular activity; some two thousand privateer vessels
sailed during the Revolutionary War.7 Their attacks on British commerce did contribute
to the overall war effort, though the extent of that contribution is still hotly debated.8
Privateering during the Revolution was a multilayered activity as well, with involvement

This figure comes from Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six:
The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 964; and
Gardner Weld Allen, Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution (Boston: Massachusetts Historical
Society, 1927), 13. Edgar Stanton Maclay puts the number of privateers at 792, though he offers no sources
for this number; see Edgar Stanton Maclay, A History of American Privateers (New York: D. Appleton &
Co., 1899), viii. The Naval Records puts the figure at 1,697, though this does not include privateers from
individual colonies; see Michael Scott Casey, Rebel Privateers: The Winners of American Independence
(master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), 59.
8
A good synthesis of the arguments can be found in Michael J. Crawford, “The Privateering Debate in
Revolutionary America,” The Northern Mariner 21 (2011), 1035-39.
7
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from lower-class sailors and deckhands and upper-class merchants and investors. Some
of the most recognizable figures of the Revolution invested in privateering; names like
George Washington, John Adams, Robert Morris, Nathanael Greene, and John Hancock
grace the pages of privateer commissions.
Despite the fact that privateering was a prominent piece of the Revolutionary War
at sea, privateering has never been a popular topic for scholars of the Revolution. It was
admittedly an auxiliary facet of the war from a strategic perspective; the Battles of
Saratoga and Yorktown arguably contributed more to the overall American victory than
the actions of privateers. More than that, the typical conception of a privateer does not fit
the mythos of the American Revolution. The War of Independence is seen as a virtuous
war, one where noble American militiamen and colonists fought to secure their rights and
liberty in the face of tyranny. The picture of the roguish, quasi-legitimate sea plunderer
supposedly motivated by the pursuit of profit does not fit easily into this idealized notion
of the Revolution.
As a result, few scholars have attempted to place privateering into that
Revolutionary narrative. Instead, they gloss over the motivations for privateering—
usually mentioning some component of the profit-motive narrative—then focus on the
strategic impact of privateering on the outcome of the war. In one of the earliest works on
privateering, Edgar Stanton Maclay briefly mentions that the growth of privateering was
tied to “the profits from prizes,” but spends the bulk of his work arguing that privateers
themselves were the primary party responsible for America’s victory in the war due to
their devastating attacks on British commerce.9 William Bell Clark’s investigation of

9

For the brief discussion of the profit motive, see Maclay, History of American Privateers, 114. For a clear
statement of Maclay’s argument on privateering’s importance to the war, see ibid. xi.
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Benjamin Franklin’s privateers argues that Franklin’s investment was remarkable in that
it was not primarily driven by profit. However, Clark thens paint the privateersmen
themselves as Irish smugglers and rogues who had little interest in anything but profit and
plunder.10 Michael Scott Casey’s thesis ignores the motivations for privateering entirely;
he makes a strategic argument to demonstrate that privateers were more effective in the
war than the Continental Navy, an argument he supports with numerous mathematical
and statistical models.11 Scholars analyzing Revolutionary privateering usually ignore the
motivations for the practice, and those that do consider them write off privateering as a
primarily profit-driven phenomenon with the occasional secondary motive of stealing
from the British.
Scholarship on privateering before the Revolutionary War, however, has done a
far better job analyzing privateering’s motivations and placing it in a framework beyond
that of military strategy. Marcus Rediker is one of the primary scholars in this field. He
has written at length on eighteenth-century privateering from the perspective of the sailor,
arguing that privateers and the “motley crew” that made up the sailing industry can be
seen as an early proletariat formed in opposition to both the dangerous natural world of
the sea and the often-authoritarian jurisdiction of the sea captain and the merchant
shipowner.12 Other scholars have turned their efforts towards analyzing privateering

William Bell Clark, Ben Franklin’s Privateers; a Naval Epic of the American Revolution (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1956).
11
Casey, Rebel Privateers, 84.
12
See Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the
Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden
History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). https://goo.gl/jQmP6j; see also Marcus
Rediker, “The Seaman as Pirate: Plunder and Social Banditry at Sea,” in C.R. Pennell, ed. Bandits at Sea:
A Pirates Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 139-168.
10
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within the context of the Elizabethan Age,13 the Dutch Golden Age,14 and maritime
bureaucracy of the eighteenth century.15 Such scholarship has moved privateering away
from a solely military practice and considered it through economic, social, and structural
perspectives.
Some scholars have started to move these discussions on privateering and its
motivations and frameworks into the Revolution; Jesse Lemisch looked at the
motivations of American sailors in his groundbreaking article “Jack Tar in the Streets,”
arguing that sailors in the Revolution were motivated by a sense of the fight for liberty
and not just their own personal gain.16 A second generation of historians has built off of
Lemisch’s argument; Paul Gilje has attempted to refute many of Lemisch’s claims in his
work,17 while Christopher Magra largely seeks to support Lemisch’s findings regarding
sailors and liberty.18 Despite their strong work Lemisch, Gilje, and Magra all fall short of
the mark as they focus on sailors as a whole, and not the more specific phenomenon of
privateering.

13

Kenneth R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering; English Privateering during the Spanish War, 15851603 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).
14
Virginia West Lunsford, Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005). https://goo.gl/3198HW.
15
David J. Starkey, “The Origins and Regulations of Eighteenth-Century British Privateering,” in Pennell,
Bandits at Sea, 69-81.
16
Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America,” The
William and Mary Quarterly 25, no. 3 (July 1968), 371-407. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1921773.
17
Paul A. Gilje, “Loyalty and Liberty: The Ambiguous Patriotism of Jack Tar in the American
Revolution,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 67, no. 2 (April 2000), 165-93.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27774256. Gilje extrapolates on these ideas in a later publication; see Paul A.
Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
18
See Christopher P. Magra, “Anti-Impressment Riots and the Origins of the Age of Revolution,”
International Review of Social History 58, no. S21 (2013), 131-51.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/ejournals/article/312651041; see also Christopher P. Magra, “The New England
Cod Fishing Industry and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution,” Enterprise & Society 8, no.
4 (December 2007), 799-806. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23700768; see also Christopher P. Magra,
“’Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’: Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts, and the Origins and Progress of the
American Revolution,” The New England Quarterly 77, no. 4 (December 2004), 531-62.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559726.
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The scholarly conception of Revolutionary privateering as primarily profitmotivated has fed the popular conception that privateering was naught but legalized
piracy. The privateering-piracy comparison is flawed, but there is some truth to the
profit-narrative. Sailors gravitated towards privateer vessels as they offered higher wages,
less restrictive enlistment agreements, and a greater prospect for seizing lucrative prizes
than other lines of work aboard ship. Investors saw in privateering an easy way to make a
quick fortune. Such investments were risky, but privateers needed only one lucrative
capture to pay off the initial investment tenfold. Privateering, when successful, could
provide an enormous payday to everyone involved, from the lowest deckhand to the
wealthiest investor. But while profit was a motivating factor, it was rarely the sole factor
providing the impetus for privateering. Those additional motivations serve as the focus of
this thesis.
When the role of privateering during the Revolutionary War is traced in
conjunction with various ideological considerations present during that conflict, a more
complex practice emerges, one that places the profit-narrative alongside wider
ideological frameworks. In this I define ideology as the conceptions and frameworks
through which individuals view the world around them. Before the war, privateering was
used by early modern European states as a tool to expand their influence into the Atlantic
world. It provided a key convergence point between the states, the wealthy mercantile
community, and the sailors on the front lines. That expansion of influence came to a
clattering halt with the political uprisings of the American Revolution; along with it,
privateering’s role underwent a marked shift, slotting itself into the new framework of the
American cause. For sailors, privateering acted as an outgrowth of pre-war methods of

8

resistance. The tars and deck hands that had rioted against the press and resisted the
British Navigation Acts before the war turned their efforts towards privateering, an
avenue they saw as a continuation of their own form of resistance to British rule. For
investors, privateering complicated the notions of republicanism. The practice seemed to
promote the private interest by neglecting and denigrating service to the public good—
one of the great hallmarks of republican virtue. Privateer investors, though, saw their
actions as a contribution to the American war effort, thus supporting the cherished public
good. To a broader audience, American privateers heralded a shift from the colonial
British identity to something new altogether. Privateers targeted the ideological
underpinnings of the British Empire itself, working to tear the American colonies from
the British ideology in order to begin constructing their own national framework.
Chapter One serves as a foundational chapter, introducing the reader to a number
of key privateering concepts and tracing the practice from its earlier forms in the
sixteenth century through the mid-eighteenth century. In this chapter I will delineate the
difference between privateering and piracy; the two phenomena may have appeared
similar in practice, but their origins and motivations stand in stark contrast. Where piracy
represented an attempt to break away from the growing influence of the state,
privateering was an inseparable part of that expansion into the Atlantic world. Its
connections to the merchant community, the state apparatus, and the common sailor
indelibly tied it to a range of actors, motivations, and ideological frameworks present in
the early modern period.
Chapters Two and Three build upon the foundation of the previous chapter by
taking privateering into the Revolutionary War. I have divided my analysis of the practice

9

and its motivations into two groups: the sailors and the investors. The former is the focus
of Chapter Two; I analyze how sailors were in part encouraged to take up privateering as
a means of profit and livelihood. That drive for profit occasionally turned into a drive for
plunder. Beyond the profit-motive, though, sailors also used privateering as a means to
fight back against British authority; in that sense in particular, the practice built off of
acts of resistance that colored Anglo-American relations before the Revolution, like the
aforementioned burning of the Gaspee in Narragansett Bay. Chapter Three moves from
the ship’s deck to the drawing room, where investors and elites planned their privateer
expeditions. Here too was a drive for profit, but one that had to be tempered within the
confines of the ideological debate on republicanism. Privateering did not sit easily with
the republican virtues of disinterestedness and sacrifice to the public commonwealth;
privateer enthusiasts had to walk a careful line between their investments and their
devotion to the causes of country and republic.
Chapter Four takes a broader perspective, looking at privateering’s place in the
ideological context of the war as a whole. The Revolutionary War marked America’s
separation from a properly British identity and a step towards the creation of a new one.
Privateering played a role in this movement too. Privateers attacked the foundations of
the British Empire, terrifying British citizens at home and infuriating the British Navy at
sea. They targeted Britain’s mercantile networks, its commercial dominance, and the
Royal Navy, which served as both the glue that held the colonial system together and an
immense source of pride and freedom for the British people. While the privateers targeted
key ideological components of British identity, it was not out of spite at the entire

10

ideological construction. It was rather a clear avenue for the American colonists to push
back against the presence of British authority and create a clean break with that authority.
As privateers closely relate to so many facets of the early modern and
revolutionary periods, this thesis will inevitably touch on elements of naval strategy, state
structure, economic principles, and class structure. My principle argument, though, is an
ideological one. The study of privateers is not only an example of profit-driven plunder,
but also a unique phenomenon in the ideological framework of the American Revolution,
a war that was positively saturated with ideology. Privateers were influenced by that
ideology to a large degree and, in some cases, helped drive that ideology forward during
the War for Independence.
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CHAPTER ONE: PRIVATEERING AND THE FOLLY OF
“LEGALIZED PIRACY”
Your true privateer was a sort of half-horse, half-alligator,
with a streak of lightning in his composition—something
like a man-of-war’s man, but much more like a pirate—
generally with a super-abundance of whiskey, as if he held
with Sampson that his strength was in the quantity of his
hair.1
Gomer Williams’ fanciful definition of privateering from his 1898 work History
of the Liverpool Privateers feels absurd to the modern scholar. No longer do we equate
privateers with horses or alligators, and Sampson has no part to play in any privateering
narrative. Yet one of Williams’ statements has persisted the test of time: that of equating
privateering with piracy. Both in scholarship and in popular conceptions, privateers have
long been reduced to “legalized pirates.” Recent works have insisted that “the difference
between the privateer and pirate is no wider than the letter of marque,” and that “piracy
and privateering differed only in that the latter activity was officially sanctioned by a
monarch.”2 Some scholars have gone further, calling privateering piracy’s “legal alter
ego” and even suggesting that privateering “was not unlike acts of state sponsored
terrorism in the modern world.”3

1

Gomer Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque: With an Account of the
Liverpool Slave Trade, 1744-1812 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 5.
https://goo.gl/Kjc7hF.
2
George Shelvocke, A Privateer’s Voyage round the World, ed. Vincent McInerney (Barnsley: Seaforth
Publishing, 2010), 12-15. https://goo.gl/DYdlJM; Kris E. Lane, Blood & Silver: A History of Piracy in the
Caribbean and Central America (Oxford: Signal, 1999), 38.
3
Robert C. Ritchie, “Piracy,” in Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007). https://goo.gl/n53uZE; Todd Sandler and John A.C. Conybeare, “StateSponsored Violence as a Tragedy of the Commons: England’s Privateering Wars with France and Spain,
1625-1630,” Public Choice 77, no. 4 (1993), 880-82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30027194.
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Privateers and pirates both took part in maritime robbery and plunder, but to
equate the two as nearly identical in all but name and legality severely misses the nuances
in each practice. In this chapter I will provide detailed descriptions of both privateering
and piracy in the early modern era (1500-1750) to show the marked differences between
the two phenomena. Where privateering was a heavily regulated activity that was
indelibly connected to the mercantile community and the growing state, pirates sought to
break away from that society and form their own egalitarian community. The second half
of the chapter goes on to analyze the importance of privateering’s relationship with the
state, its role in the interplay between the merchant community and the lower-class sailor,
and its unique position in the emerging ideologies of national identity. The breadth and
complexity of those relationships demonstrate that privateering cannot be written off as
merely a profit-driven practice. By clearly defining privateering in opposition to piracy
and placing privateering within the infrastructure of the state, commerce, and ideology,
this chapter will foreshadow privateering’s roles within the context of the American
Revolutionary War.
The Cog and the Missing Piece: Privateering and Piracy
In differentiating between privateering and piracy, the best place to start is in their
respective definitions. Privateering is the practice by which legitimate sovereign
governments authorized private citizens to outfit ships in an effort to seize enemy vessels
during wartime, with those seizures subject to the jurisdiction of that sovereign. While
privateering refers to a specific form of maritime plunder, piracy encompasses a greater
number of incidents. Piracy is the unlawful or illegitimate seizure of property at sea by a

13

captain or ship officially unaffiliated with any governing body.4 The definition is
intentionally broad. Piracy has been practiced in every corner of the world’s oceans since
ancient times, and the variations between instances of piracy are considerable. To make
the comparison of privateering and piracy more feasible, I will restrict my study of piracy
to the same geographic locale and time frame as I do for privateering: the early modern
Atlantic world.
The definitions provided above offer a distinction between privateering and piracy
on the basis of legitimacy, but the differences between the two run deeper than that. By
tracing the origins of privateering and the way it operated within the expanding Atlantic
world, I will demonstrate the ways in which privateering was not “legalized piracy.”
Privateering was intricately connected to the state that sanctioned it and the merchants
that funded it. Piracy, though, was not an integral part of that system, and indeed sought
to fight back against the encroachment of European states upon their ways of life.
Separating privateering from piracy is the first step away from a narrow-minded focus on
the profit motive for privateering. Only once privateering is understood as a separate
phenomenon from piracy can its important position within the expanding Atlantic state
and commercial system be understood.
It is difficult, and in many ways fruitless, to trace the exact origins of privateering.
The term “privateer” did not come into wide use until sometime in the seventeenth
century, but the practice of outfitting private ships of war dates back to at least the

Robert Ritchie defines piracy as “theft at sea;” see Ritchie, “Piracy,” in Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime
History. I consider this definition far too broad, and have provided my own, more specific definition of the
practice.
4
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Middle Ages.5 The legal and moral basis of the practice was rooted in the right of
reprisal, whereby “individuals could seek the authority of their state to redress, by force if
necessary, losses inflicted by foreign seafarers.”6 Privateering was, in its simplest form, a
means of payback for losses at sea. One of the earliest examples of privateering occurred
in 1585, after a group of armed Spanish ships captured a number of English merchant
vessels anchored off the Iberian coast. In response to the attacks, the English Lord
Admiral issued “letters of reprisal to those who proved their losses to his satisfaction.”7
The central figure to privateering from the start then was the merchant trader; it was their
property that ships of reprisal sought to recover. Early private ships of reprisal quickly
combined property reacquisition with the search for profit and plunder. Those latter
factors came to characterize privateering of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, but
the practice never entirely broke from its origins in reprisal. Captain Woodes Rogers
stated that he and his men embarked on a privateer voyage in 1708 “to retrieve the Losses
we had sustained by the Enemy.”8 Throughout the eighteenth century merchants who
suffered losses in wartime shifted their investments to privateer expeditions in an effort to
replace the lost capital with commercial plunder.
Before sailing privateers had to apply to their government for a commission or a
letter of marque. Such commissions would only be granted during wartime, and could
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only be issued by legitimate governing authorities.9 The act of commissioning vessels
dates back to early forms of privateering in the Elizabethan Age. The information
included in these bond applications varied little over time and were relatively consistent
from country to country. Applicants detailed the principal investors in the expedition; the
ship’s name, type, and tonnage; the number of crew; and the armament of the vessel. If
the application was successful, the owners of the privateer would pay a bond as insurance
that the ship and her crew would act according to the law. That bond could be confiscated
if the privateer exceeded the stipulations of its commission. Having privateers fill out
applications shifted the responsibility to the government for any illegal activity on the
part of the privateers. Theoretically governments could deny privateer commissions to
regulate the number of privateers at sea at any given time, but evidence suggests that
applications were accepted far more often than they were denied.10
The English privateering regulations—and later, the British and American
regulations—did not require much more on the part of the privateer. Dutch privateers
during the seventeenth century, though, had a number of other responsibilities mandated
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by the States-General and the various Admiralties. Dutch privateer captains were to keep
a journal of their voyage and submit that journal to the Admiralty and the owners upon
the conclusion of the cruise. They were to treat their men “decently and properly.”11 They
had to lead their crews in prayer twice a day, and could not take the Lord’s name in vain.
Such strict regulations on a governmental level are unique to the Dutch system of
privateering; most other nations satisfied themselves with more relaxed guarantees that
privateers would follow basic laws of seizure and plunder.
There is an important distinction between a privateer and a letter of marque.
Letter of marque is an oft-misused term; it applies both to the document authorizing the
vessel and the vessel itself. The matter is further complicated by primary news sources
that interchangeably used the terms “privateer,” “letter of marque,” and “pirate,”
suggesting that contemporary observers saw little need to distinguish one form of sea
plunder from another. A privateer received a commission to attack an enemy’s trade; it
was exclusively a private ship-of-war with the sole intention of attacking enemy
commerce. A letter of marque was a merchant ship intending to embark on trading
missions, but with authorization to attack enemy vessels should it come across them.
Letters of marque allowed merchant investors to maximize profits by combining their
peaceful merchant trade with the potential for wartime prizes. However, letters of marque
also spent more time cruising for prizes, leading to a delay in the delivery of mercantile
goods.12
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As privateering became more institutionalized within state regulations the role of
prize courts within the practice increased. Privateers could not merely seize plunder and
take it for themselves; the prize had to be adjudicated by an Admiralty court.13 Prize
rulings often proved a lengthy and complicated process. First, the prize had to be
legitimated; if it was not a legal capture, no prize money could be granted. If any other
friendly ships were in the area of the capture, they could claim a cut of the prize money.
Recaptures could be especially fraught with difficulty; if the prize had not been in enemy
hands for a certain period of time, it was not an eligible prize.14 If the prize was deemed
legitimate and good, prize agents then went about selling the ship and its cargo to local
merchants and entrepreneurs, a process that could take months depending on the size of
the port and the tenacity of the prize agents. The settlement of prizes from privateer
voyages was immensely complex, with each new prize providing its own wrinkles and
subtleties. It was not uncommon for prize agents to find themselves hopelessly behind on
their work. Prize courts brought a degree of legality and legitimacy to sea plunder, and
though they often proved to be a complex, bureaucratic nightmare, they offered an
effective means to regulate the captures of privateers.15
Privateering was nominally regulated by the state at every step of the process;
however, in practice state control was more often a fallacy than a reality. Privateering
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emerged in the Elizabethan era, a period of history not known for tight state control of
maritime affairs. Kenneth Andrews described how “the regulation of privateering
provides a striking example of late Elizabethan administration at its worst—feeble and
corrupt.”16 Even as the state bureaucracy grew in power, colonies and ports far from
European waters remained almost uncontrollable. In the Caribbean, Henry Morgan
served for a number of years as deputy governor of Jamaica despite his close ties to the
unscrupulous buccaneering community. During his tenure the interests of colonial
Jamaica unsurprisingly fell in line with the interests of Caribbean buccaneers.17 About the
same time, English colonial Governor Thomas Modyford tried to begin the practice of
“peace time privateering,” which truly would have been legalized piracy.18 Even if the
state had been more eager and able to control privateering, state regulations often meant
little in the vast, ungovernable realm of the world’s oceans. Many captains who set sail as
privateers, including Claas Compaen, William Kidd, and George Shelvocke, committed
acts of piracy during their cruises.19 In the search for plunder on the high seas, weakly
enforced state regulations meant little, and the line between privateer and pirate became
difficult to discern.
The ambiguities between privateering and piracy are further complicated by the
fact that legitimacy was a question of perspective rather than empiricism. There were no
agreed-upon international laws defining acts of piracy and privateering; the judgement
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fell to individual states and kingdoms. In this context, one man’s pirate could be
another’s national hero. To Spain, nearly every ship seized from their holdings in the
Caribbean was the result of piracy, but to Spain’s rivals (at varying times the English,
French, and Dutch) they were legitimate acts of privateering.20 The perspective of
contemporary observers on the legitimacy and legality of a capture makes it difficult for
historians to clearly delineate who was a privateer and who was a pirate in all cases.
There is however a key difference in practice between the operations of privateers
and pirates: the hierarchy of the vessel. On a privateer, the captain was the sole
commander of the vessel. His word, and the word of his officers, was the law. While
privateers had fewer regulations regarding punishment of sailors than state navies, life on
board a privateer could still be harsh. On a cruise during the Revolutionary War,
privateersman Joshua Davis relates an incident where “Capt. [John] MANLY struck [the
boatswain] with the cutlass on the cheek, with such force that his teeth were to be seen
from the upper part of his jaw to the lower part of his chin.”21 Additionally, privateer
captains and their officers received a much larger share of prize money than average
sailors; a typical ratio would have been about twelve shares to the captain for every one
share to the common sailor.22 Privateers operated under a strict linear hierarchy, running

As Kris E. Lane states, in the seventeenth century Spain’s rivals “were following a double course: on the
one hand they claimed to be actively suppressing the buccaneers, and on the other they encouraged the
illegal activities of at least some of them.” Lane, Blood & Silver, 124. See also John L. Anderson’s
argument that “in the Caribbean, piracy originated in and was fueled by Old World rivalries;” John L.
Anderson, “Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation, in C.R. Pennell,
ed. Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 83.
21
Joshua Davis, “Narrative of Joshua Davis,” Naval History and Heritage Command, April 09, 2015.
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/n/narrativejoshua-davis-american-citizen-1811.html.
22
David J. Starkey, “The Origins and Regulations of Eighteenth-Century British Privateering,” in Pennell,
Bandits at Sea, 73.
20

20

from the common sailor through the captain and up to the merchant owner of the
expedition.
Atlantic pirates in the early modern era refrained from such a hierarchical system,
utilizing a proto-democratic system of governance on board their ships. Sailors would
elect a captain to lead the ship, but the most important decisions were made by a council,
which Marcus Rediker describes as “the highest authority on the pirate ship.”23 Captains
would at most receive two shares of prize money for every single share to the common
sailor, and punishments were decided by the crew, not the captain. The sovereign of the
ship was its crew; there was no linear hierarchy aboard pirate vessels.
That operational difference points to a larger and more important distinction
between privateering and piracy. Whereas privateers were indivisibly tied to the state and
the merchants that sanctioned and operated them, pirates were beholden only to
themselves, and indeed sought to break away from the encroaching hand of state and
merchant control. Privateering emerged from the right of reprisal among the merchant
community and, as I shall demonstrate later in this chapter, was only possible through
investment from that community. States used—and occasionally relied on—privateers to
wage guerre de course against their foes. In the relationship between maritime
commerce, the mercantile community, and interstate warfare, privateering was an
important lynchpin, and by definition could not be removed from that system.
Pirates, on the other hand, operated entirely outside that system. Buccaneers in
Jamaica and Dominica lived in self-sustaining communities, often with nebulous
leadership structures. “In their enterprises,” J.S. Bromley states, “they practiced notions
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of liberty and equality, even of fraternity,” and operated in a remarkably egalitarian
fashion.24 But breaking away from the merchant- and state-driven system was not
enough; pirates in the Caribbean fought the encroachment of the modern state upon their
way of life. Rediker writes that “the foremost target of vengeance was the merchant
captain,” and describes how pirates would punish and harass captains who had ill-treated
their crews.25 The motivations of both privateers and pirates, at least in part, was plunder;
however, the root source of that motivation varies between the two. Where privateers
were driven by the state and merchant investors, pirates were driven by a desire to avoid
the influence of the state and the merchant.
Privateers were a cog in the machine of early modern commercial expansion.
They were recruited, outfitted, and funded by the mercantile community who sought to
recover lost commerce (and indeed gain new profit) during wartime, and were beholden
to the legal regulations of the state. The parts of this machine did not always work in
unison; the state at times condoned what was more akin to piracy than privateering, and
privateers often pushed the limits of their commissions, particularly in regions far away
from the centers of power. It could indeed be a greasy, ineffective machine; but while
privateering was a part of the machine, piracy wanted no place in it. Pirates sought to
break away from the trappings of the early modern state. They formed egalitarian
communities of their own, and frequently targeted merchant vessels that represented the
world they had left behind. That key difference—the role in the system of state and
commercial Atlantic expansion—separates the privateer from the pirate.
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States, Commerce, and Ideology: The Complexities of Privateering
In order to expand their influence into the wider Atlantic world during the early
modern era, European leaders increasingly relied on the growing power of the state, the
boundless ambition of the commercial classes, and a burgeoning sense of national pride
among their people. Privateering was an integral part of all three. As a state-sanctioned
activity privateering played a role in maritime strategy, and could create both
complications and opportunities in the field of diplomacy. Privateering was driven by the
moneyed mercantile classes, who saw the practice as a way to advance their own interests
and profit from the frequent wars of the early modern period. It offered a unique arena
where lower-class sailors and middle- to upper-class elites could work together towards a
common goal of making money from wartime sea plunder. As a large swath of social
classes took part in privateering, it should come as no surprise that privateers became
unique symbols of national identity, particularly for the Dutch and English peoples and,
later, for British colonists in the Americas. Privateering’s role in state, commercial, and
ideological expansion during the early modern period would come to foreshadow their
actions during the American Revolutionary War, and is thus an important foundation for
my later analysis of privateering during that conflict.
Privateering and the State
As I demonstrated in the first part of this chapter, privateering was by definition a
state-sanctioned activity. It first emerged in the sixteenth century, at a time when states
lacked the necessary infrastructure to raise and maintain large standing armies and
navies. Instead, they relied on private ships of war and private mercenaries to make up
the bulk of their forces. The earliest privateer expeditions were mounted by states with
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little-to-no significant naval fighting force. During the Elizabethan Age, the limited
number of royal ships were deployed in defensive measures; their duties, in the words of
Kenneth Andrews, were “to protect English shores, to maintain communications and
supply lines between the allies, and to deny Spain the use of western European waters.”26
That strategy left little room for offensive action; to that end, Queen Elizabeth called on
England’s aggressive and ambitious mercantile elite to provide privateers to attack
Spanish commercial shipping lanes. Andrews accurately surmises that privateering
during the Elizabethan Age was “the product of the coexistence of ambitious traders and
predatory gentry.”27 Private ships of war could be used defensively as well; in the early
part of the Eighty Years’ War between the United Provinces and Spain, the Dutch relied
on the Watergeutzen (Sea Beggars) to defend coasts and rivers from Spanish attack. The
Sea Beggars were instrumental in relieving the Dutch city of Leiden from a Spanish siege
in 1574.28 Privateers could offer states with less-developed naval forces both an offensive
and defensive maritime component to their grand strategy, albeit an often unruly and illdisciplined one.
As states improved their infrastructures, the need for privatized violence in turn
diminished. On land states began using standing armies of their own recruits, all but
eradicating the role of the mercenary soldier. At sea, the role of the privateers was not
eliminated; rather, it took on a new task in the broader scheme of maritime strategy. As
David Starkey states, privateering gradually “became less of a substitute for, and more of
a supplement to, the naval forces of states.”29 The Dutch Sea Beggars gradually
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transitioned from the main maritime arm of the Dutch forces into a group that shared
primacy with the official Dutch navy. They began participating in more guerre de course
activities than defensive measures. Privateers were also increasingly employed by major
Dutch trading companies to attack enemy commerce and line the pockets of Dutch
merchants.30 Privateers became the auxiliary force to the official navy, rather than the
primary naval force of the state.
As the privateers’ central role in state security decreased, their main theatre of
operations shifted to the peripheries of conflicts to target enemy trade. While the English
navy made defense of the homeland its primary objective, English privateers had a free
hand to ravage Spanish treasure ships in the Caribbean. The activity of privateers in the
West Indies, Andrews argues, helped break the Spanish monopoly of the region and open
the Caribbean for Dutch, French, and English trading expeditions.31 Privateers also
attacked Spanish commerce in the Pacific, though as Tim Beattie explains these long
voyages often brought more misery than profit.32 For much of the early modern era,
privateers offered states an opportunity to either establish a maritime component to their
fighting forces or augment the maritime forces already in place.
While privateering could offer strategic benefits, it could also create diplomatic
tensions between states. Privateers were often a difficult lot to control, and did not take
kindly to being forced to cease their plundering activities. In the late 1640s, the Dutch
were seeking to establish peace with Portugal. Dutch privateers, though, continued to raid
Portuguese shipping even as the Dutch made peace overtures. One pamphlet called the
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privateers “pernicious, scandalous, ungodly, and unchristian” for their actions in
preventing the peace.33 The port of Dunkirk was a notorious haven for French and Dutch
privateers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The attacks of those privateers
incensed the British. The British solved the matter in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713,
which stipulated that the fortifications in Dunkirk would be demolished and a British
observer posted in the city to prevent privateers from ever sailing from that port again.34
The privateers’ activities at the edges of legitimacy meant they frequently posed
diplomatic quandaries for states; conversely, though, creative statesmen could use
privateers to push the boundaries of diplomatic legitimacy. The Americans used
privateers to that effect during the Revolutionary War. It was nominally illegal for
privateers to sell prizes in a neutral port. That law posed complications to American
privateers sailing in European waters; it was far from efficient to send prizes across the
Atlantic for jurisdiction. Continental Navy captains like Lambert Wickes started to make
overtures to the French regarding the possible sale of American prizes in French ports.
Tensions were further escalated when American Captain Gustavus Conyngham sailed out
of Dunkirk and began attacking British shipping, a blatant violation of French
neutrality.35 The British were furious. British Ambassador to France Lord Stormont wrote
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to his superior Lord Weymouth, “Your Lordship can want no further Proofs of the
Constant Duplicity and insidious Policy of [the French] Court,” and suggested that
Britain “have a great Fleet ready to act instantly so that if the Necessity should arise we
may be able to strike at once a decisive Blow [against the French] which might end the
War the Moment it began.”36 By using privateers to test the bounds of French neutrality,
the Americans helped push the French closer to a possible alliance with the colonists and
into the war against Britain. While privateers often proved problematic in the fields of
diplomacy, they could be used as effective tools of coercion by creative statesmen.
Privateering, Commerce, and the Investor-Sailor Relationship
Privateering played a key role in state expansion and maritime strategy, first
serving as the primary naval force of a country then taking on a supplemental role
following infrastructure expansion. But while the state sanctioned privateers, the impetus
for the practice came from the moneyed commercial classes. These wealthy investors
provided the ships and the guns; they recruited sailors and hired captains for the
expeditions; they purchased foodstuffs for the cruise; and their names graced the
commission applications. At the same time, while investors funded the expeditions,
sailors were the ones manning the vessels. The investors and sailors were diametrically
opposed socio-economic classes, yet in privateering they found themselves working
towards a common goal. More often than not, that goal was profit.
In his survey of privateering during the Elizabethan Age, Kenneth Andrews
closely analyzes the various groups that invested in privateers. He describes how
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“English maritime ambition,” of which privateering was an indelible part, was
characterized by “the drive of the merchants to extend trade, and the drive of the gentry
for plunder.”37 He describes three categories of privateer investors: amateurs,
professionals, and great merchants. Amateurs were usually young noblemen, driven by
fantasies of glory and prestige. They gambled on privateer expeditions, and they gambled
big. Usually, they lost big too; Andrews states that “the adventurers were not likely to see
their money again unless some unusual slice of luck befell the ships.”38 A “professional,”
for Andrews, was a “captain, shipowner, official or simply ‘man of war’ [who]
understood the business.”39 This group consisted of captains who owned and sailed their
own ships on privateer cruises, usually on short-term cruises along the coast rather than
long ocean voyages.40
The most important group of investors is the third and final group: the “great
merchants.”41 The infrastructure was already in place for merchants to succeed in
privateering. They could recycle their trading vessels as private men of war. While some
ships were specially constructed as privateers, the vast majority were converted
merchantmen.42 Their prior trading expeditions would have put them in contact with
captains and sailors to crew their vessels, and merchants would have typically had
enough funds to pay those sailors.43 Merchant investors were able to use their preexisting
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trading networks to arm their vessels and, more importantly, to purchase food for the
crew. On long ocean voyages food was a costly investment, and a lack of food could
completely derail an expedition.44 The merchants were the lynchpin of the privateering
phenomenon; they worked with other amateur and professional investors, they outfitted
their own vessels, and they drove the impetus for privateering at the state level. As the
role of the gentry in privateering dissipated through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, the merchants who already played a critical role in the practice came to
dominate privateering investments. By the mid-eighteenth century in the American
colonies, “the overwhelming majority of privateer investors listed their profession as
‘merchant’ when they applied for letters of marque.”45
If merchants were the lynchpin of privateering, the sailors were its backbone.
Privateering was a popular venture for sailors and landsmen alike. It was typical for a
privateer to sail with a considerable complement of landsmen on board; one privateer
sailed from Liverpool in 1779 with eighteen landsmen, comprising about twenty percent
of the crew.46 It was not uncommon to find state navies struggling to maintain full crews
due to the allure of privateering. Virginia Lunsford cites an example from the
Netherlands where a warship’s entire crew deserted the navy to sign aboard a privateer.47
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Between the options of service in the state navy and sailing with a privateer, many sailors
and landsmen preferred the latter option.
Privateering’s popularity among sailors can be attributed in large part to its
promise of financial gain. In Robinson Crusoe, Daniel Defoe stated that privateering was
“for men of desperate fortunes on the one hand, or of aspiring, superior fortunes on the
other.”48 Nathaniel Boteler commented that “there is nothing that more bewitcheth [the
privateers], nor anything wherein they promise to themselves so loudly nor delight in
more mainly [as] the business of pillage.”49 Privateers provided sailors a larger share of
prize money, and as they almost exclusively targeted commercial vessels, the potential
for larger prize shares could be limitless. Broadsides advertising privateer cruises
routinely emphasized the potential for profit, like this one from Liverpool in 1756:
All gentlemen, seamen, and able-bodied landmen that are willing to fight
the French and make their fortunes, may meet with suitable
encouragement by entering on board the The Grand Buck Privateer,
Captain John Coppell, Commander.50
In much the same way that privateering was a business investment for the merchants, it
was an investment for the sailors. Their goal, by and large, was to profit from prizes and
plunder.
Privateering was a unique phenomenon of the early modern world in that it
brought together the wealthiest of investors and the lowest of paupers in common pursuit
of profit. Commonality did not lead to any semblance of equality or brotherhood;
investors maintained rigid control of the expedition. They provided their captains with
strict instructions stipulating how the voyage should proceed. A privateer who failed to
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follow the owner’s instructions would likely be fired and struggle to find work again as a
captain. The instructions were remarkably detailed and left little room for freelancing on
the part of the privateer captain, as in this set of instructions given to Captain James
Haslam in 1779:
[You] are by the first oppertunity to sail from hence and make the best of
your way to sea by the North or South Channel, as the wind may offer
most favourable, but we prefer the former if to be effected without any
extraordinary Risque…In this case don’t keep too near the coast of
Ireland, and be sure to gain the longitude of 20 West from London before
you go to the southward of the latitude of 53…when the westing is gain’d
you are to cross the latitudes under an easy sail to the Island of St. Mary’s,
then to cruise about five degrees to the westward of it, now and then
stretching half a degree to the southward…51
Haslam’s instructions continue on for another four pages, and account for nearly every
possible eventuality in the cruise. His instructions also gave explicit orders on how to
treat prisoners and crew, and even how to proceed in the event of Captain Haslam’s
death. Of course there was no guarantee that a privateer captain would actually follow
these instructions; once a privateer left port, there was no way to regulate their actions.
Some investors, particularly on long transoceanic privateer voyages, attempted to curb
this problem by sending agents along with the expedition. George Shelvocke describes a
“Mr. Godfrey, the owners’ agent-general,” aboard the lead ship in his expedition.52 By
micromanaging the actions of their privateers the merchants sought to prevent their
investments from committing costly transgressions that could bring international
embarrassment for the state and financial losses for the investors.
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There was some pushback from privateersmen regarding the investors’
micromanagement of expeditions. Unforeseen happenings were common at sea in the
early modern period, incidents which no amount of instructional detail or foresight could
take into account. Even agents might not be able to prevent transgressions; Shelvocke’s
expedition had two agents on board, but the crew still “drew up a paper of articles
respecting a new division of any plunder.”53 Privateers were focused solely on seizing
prizes, increasing the likelihood that the crew would mutiny over the distribution of prize
money.54 As a result of ill-discipline regarding prize shares, the British Admiralty
mandated articles of agreement for privateering in 1729. David Starkey defines these
articles as “contracts prepared by the promoters of the venture, and signed by members of
the ship’s company as they enlisted, their purpose being to establish the object of the
business, the obligations of the various parties to the agreement and the distribution of
rewards between these parties.”55 The articles served as a binding contract between the
two sides, ideally ensuring a fair balance of the profits and a certain degree of
cooperation between sailors and owners. As states increased in strength and more
regulations went into effect, both from the state and from the owners, mutinies regarding
prize money became less commonplace, though tensions remained.
Privateering was in many ways an outgrowth of the mercantile community of the
early modern era. Ambitious merchants used privateers to make a profit during wartime
by preying on enemy commerce. They had the funds, expertise, and connections needed
to engage in privateering and ensure a higher rate of success in their investment. While
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merchants footed the bill, sailors did the heavy lifting, joining privateer ventures in the
hopes of making their own fortunes. Despite some occasional disagreements regarding
prize money and the operation of the vessel, the two disparate groups worked in relative
unison towards the pursuit of profit through privateering.
Privateering and National Ideology
Privateering developed through encouragement from the state, investment from
the mercantile classes, and participation from the sailors. With its close ties to the
expanding state and lower- and upper-class segments of society, the role of privateering
in early modern nationalist narratives and ideologies should not come as a surprise.
Privateers were not representative of the power of the state, but rather the power of the
people working towards both the advancement of self and the advancement of state. In
doing so they became national heroes and cultural symbols to their people, serving as far
more than sea-rovers and plunderers but rather icons whose achievements and actions
contributed to the constructions of national and cultural identity.
Virginia Lunsford addresses the intersection of privateering and national identity
directly in her work Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands, suggesting
that Dutch privateers, Sea Beggars, and even pirates exemplified elements of a Dutch
national consciousness. The Dutch national identity was built in opposition to Spanish
control of the region; where the Spanish were autocratic, the Dutch sought to be more
republican. The spirit of republicanism was embodied in the freebooting lifestyle of
privateers. The Dutch also connected with the sea as both a destructive force, which
could wash away their lives, and a provider of boundless wealth from shipping and
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fishing.56 The privateers served as an occasional destructive force to the Dutch people,
but more often provided wealth and prosperity to Dutch sailors and investors. The trades
of merchants and privateers were not capricious and materialistic avenues for wealth but
rather patriotic representations of Dutch glory. Dutch privateers were sea-based, nonautocratic, commercially-focused citizens seeking to line their own pockets and defend
the Dutch nation. In doing so, Dutch privateers both took from and contributed to
elements of Dutch cultural identity during the seventeenth century.57
English (and later British) privateers had a similar relationship with conceptions
of their own cultures and national identities. The Elizabethan Age was seen as a crowning
period of English maritime prowess, with Sea Dog privateers Francis Drake and John
Hawkins projecting an English presence across the oceans of the world at the expense of
the Spanish. Andrews states that privateering and plunder during the Elizabethan Age
“increasingly identified itself with Protestantism and patriotism.”58 He later suggests that
privateering was “a special vehicle of national feeling” that brought together disparate
parts of English society like “court and country gentlemen, merchant magnates and local
traders, captains and masters…and the mob of sailors, old hands [and] raw recruits.”59
The age was later looked back upon as a foundation for England’s maritime emphasis.
Gomer Williams calls it “the golden age of privateering,” when “the profession was
carried on by men cast in the heroic mould.”60 Tim Beattie has also asserted that the long-
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distance voyages of Britain’s privateers built upon a narrative and mythos of semiprofessional, private sailors contributing to the defense and glory of the nation, despite
the voyages’ eventual failures.61 The growth of the English (and later British) maritime
empire necessitated the creation of maritime symbols of prestige and greatness. Along
with the Royal Navy, privateers represented the English peoples’ initiative, seamanship,
and ambition in projecting their empire throughout the world’s oceans.
The British Empire of course included colonies in the Americas, which
increasingly sent out privateers during Britain’s various wars of the eighteenth century.
They too hearkened back to the privateers of the Elizabethan Age. Privateering was a
popular phenomenon in the colonies; Alexander Hamilton (a Maryland physician, not the
Founding Father) commented on the spectacle of “flags and ensigns” that greeted him as
he entered Philadelphia, the colorful displays of a port prepared to send out privateers in
search of plunder.62 Carl Swanson studied the attitudes of Americans toward their
privateers during the 1740s, and concluded that “it is impossible to miss the sense of
pride that equated America’s privateers with Drake and Hawkins.”63
For maritime-minded empires, privateering offered a symbolic demonstration of
the power of the people and the maritime destiny of the nation. As such the practice
became embroiled in the national ideologies of the Dutch, English, and American
peoples. Privateering was an indelible part of Atlantic expansion in the early modern
period. It provided states with more flexibility in crafting naval strategy. It channeled the
ambition of both sailors and merchants towards plundering the nation’s enemies.
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Privateering’s significance in that expansion is demonstrated in its place in nationalist
ideologies emphasizing maritime glory. Privateering was not a phenomenon in isolation;
it existed at the crossroads between the state, the merchant community, and the sailor,
and was underpinned by varying degrees of a nationalist ideology.
Conclusion
Privateers were a unique and at times crucial cog in the early modern Atlantic
world, an arena that saw the rise of colonialism and the modern state and unprecedented
levels of transatlantic commerce. Their position was far beyond that of “legalized
piracy;” privateers were a part of the system, the lower portion of the sailor-merchantstate hierarchy, while pirates operated outside of and against the state- and merchantdriven system of Atlantic expansion. Within the Atlantic world privateers aided the state
by providing early options for naval deployment, and later acting as supplements to
imperially-minded state navies. Privateering necessitated involvement from both the
merchant investor and the sailor, groups that were both interested in profiting from the
practice. Due to the variety of socio-economic involvement in privateering the practice
became a cultural symbol for maritime-minded empires like the Dutch Empire and the
English, and later British, Empire. Privateering was a unique phenomenon in the early
modern world, one that deserves far more careful and complex analysis than that offered
by the profit-motive narrative.
Privateers that operated out of American ports fit into the expanding Atlantic
world, but after the Seven Years’ War the political climate hinted at the coming seismic
shift as Americans began to distance themselves from their former staunch identity with
the British Empire. Victory in the French and Indian War brought with it more restrictive
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enforcement of taxes as a result of the immense debt accrued by the British government.
Americans increasingly resented what they saw as “taxation without representation.”
Further acts of civil disobedience and outright resistance led to the outbreak of the
Revolutionary War in 1775, a conflict that would lead to the foundation of the new
American republic. While the colonies went through political separation from Britain, the
practice of privateering underwent a marked transformation as well. It still needed
involvement from the state and the mercantile community, but in a revolution rife with
ideologies of liberty, republicanism, and identity, the ideological component of
privateering took on a greater role than it had ever done before. The remaining three
chapters analyze that ideological component of privateering in the American Revolution,
looking first at the considerations of the sailors, then the merchants, and finally the
British and American nations.
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CHAPTER TWO: PRIVATEERSMEN, PLUNDER, AND THE
IDEOLOGIES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIBERTY

On June 2, 1775, Boston merchant Ichabod Jones arrived in the port of Machias in
upstate Maine (then a part of the Massachusetts colony) with his ships Unity and Polly,
accompanied by the British tender Margaretta commanded by Captain James Moore.
Jones was the primary merchant operating along the route from Machias to Boston,
trading vital provisions to the Machians in exchange for lumber that could be used by the
British soldiers in Boston. Jones hoped that the Machians had not yet received news of
the Battles of Lexington and Concord, and the coming war between the colonists and
Britain. He was to be disappointed. As Jones and the British sailed into port they were
greeted by the site of a Liberty Pole in the town commons. Some of the townspeople told
Jones they would not sell him any wood, knowing the lumber would be used by their
British enemies.
The response from Jones and Moore was heavy-handed. Jones withheld the vital
supplies from the Machians and requested that Moore sail the Margaretta closer to the
town so that “her Guns would reach the Houses.”1 In response the Machians attacked
Moore and Jones when they came ashore. Jones fled into the woods, while Moore
managed to return to his ship. Led by Jeremiah O’Brien and Benjamin Foster, the
townspeople seized Jones’ ship Unity and another vessel in port, the Falmouth Packet, to
pursue Moore and the Margaretta. Moore, unable to outpace the colonists, turned to
1
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fight. He perished in the ensuing battle, which saw the Americans capture the Margaretta
and its weaponry along with a number of British prisoners. When asked why he did not
surrender to the Americans, Moore exclaimed that “he preferred Death before yielding to
such a sett of Villains.”2
The Battle of Machias is often considered to be the first naval battle of the
American Revolution, and it demonstrates some of the difficulties in investigating
motivations behind private enterprise in maritime conflict. On one hand, the Machians
who attacked Jones and Moore would have described their actions as defensive,
undertaken both for self-preservation and the ideals of liberty. Indeed, a month later
O’Brien and Foster fitted out the captured Unity (now renamed Machias Liberty) as a
“Privateer for the Defence of the Place [Machias and its surrounding ports].”3 On the
other side, the Battle of Machias could be seen as an aggressive attack on British
commerce, one that was used by the American colonists as a means to profit from the
war. Vice Admiral Samuel Graves in Boston accused the Machians of outfitting their
captured ships as “pirate Vessels and…cruizing about Mechias in the Bay of Fundy.”4
Foster and O’Brien even feared that they would be “treated as Pirates” if captured.5
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The people of Machias were not commissioned privateers when they engaged
Captain Moore and the Margaretta, but the nature of the battle, in which private citizens
with varied degrees of maritime experience attacked British ships engaged in commercial
activities, closely resembles the practice of privateering as well as the driving forces
behind the phenomenon. Most scholars have emphasized that, for the common sailor,
profit was the primary motivation for joining a privateer. I do not disagree that profit was
an ever-present motivation; however, it was not the sole impetus behind privateering. For
American sailors and tars, privateering represented a means to resist British authority in
the commercial-maritime sphere, an industry where so many sailors made their
livelihoods. Privateering closely resembled other forms of resistance both before and
during the war in Revolutionary America, including tax riots, impressment riots, and
prison breaks. While privateersmen saw their actions as forms of resistance to British
authority, this should not be mistaken as a unified fight for liberty; more often than not
privateers were fighting against British intervention in their lives rather than for a vague
conception of American ideals and liberty. This chapter will analyze privateering from
the sailor’s perspective in two parts. First, I will show that privateering was in part driven
by profit, which occasionally turned into a greedy drive for plunder. Second, I will add
another dimension to the motivations for privateering by examining the practice as a fight
for individual economic and social liberties, one that borrowed from other examples of
sailor collective action during the Revolutionary Period. In doing so I hope to
demonstrate that the profit motive is not the only explanation for privateering’s
popularity among sailors during the War for Independence.
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While there is a plethora of sources on privateering from the investor’s
perspective, there are relatively few primary source documents produced by
privateersmen. A number of helpful sources can be found in the Naval Documents of the
American Revolution series, which I have used judiciously throughout this chapter. The
best firsthand accounts of privateering come from narratives written by former sailors and
deck hands. In this chapter I will draw on the accounts of Joshua Davis, Dr. Solomon
Drowne, Gideon Olmsted, Christopher Prince, Andrew Sherburne, and Christopher Vail.
These sources are admittedly far from perfect. Many were written and published after the
war, and fall victim to the distortion of historical memory. Drowne’s journal was not
even published for widespread consumption until 1872. Some of the authors, like Prince
and Sherburne, took part in religious revival movements following the war; their
newfound piety may have affected the portrayal of their younger selves. Many of the
narratives were influenced by their audience; the authors no doubt lionized some of their
accomplishments during the war to make themselves appear heroic or to garner sympathy
from the reader. The stories presented in the privateer narratives likely include some
degree of fiction and misrepresentation, but despite their flaws these still provide
meaningful insight into the sailors’ perception of privateering during the war.
A Revolutionary Gold Rush: Privateersmen and the Drive for Plunder
In October of 1780 British Admiral George Rodney wrote a letter to the
Admiralty detailing his campaigns against the American privateers. He spared no insult
in describing his adversaries:
The wretches with which their privateers are manned have no principal
whatever; they live by piracy and the plunder of their fellow subjects;
when they have been released out of humanity to return to their families
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and live by honest industry, they forget the mercy that has been shown
them, and instantly return to renew their acts of piracy.6
While Rodney’s description of the privateer sailors is certainly a biased exaggeration, he
does accurately describe one of the primary motivators for privateers: plunder. As
discussed in the previous chapter profit was an ever-present motivator for privateersmen
during the early modern era. Privateers during the American Revolution offered higher
wages than the Continental Navy, a greater chance of taking lucrative prizes, and a higher
share of whatever prize money came from the cruise.7 Colonists from all walks of life
would sign up for privateer cruises driven in part by the allure of financial gain; in some
cases, this quest for plunder obstructed everything else.
The growth in privateering’s popularity is the direct result of its perceived
profitability; it was the gold rush of the American Revolution. Seaport towns were abuzz
over the profits to be had in attacking British commerce. One privateer would return to
port laden with prizes, prompting other Americans to take up the practice as well in the
hopes of making their fortunes.8 A British officer imprisoned in Boston in 1777 attested
that “privateersmen come on shore here full of money and enjoy themselves…”9
Massachusetts statesman Elbridge Gerry commented that the news of privateer successes
had “animated the Inhabitants of the Seaports who were unable to command much
property, to write in Companies of twenty or thirty Men & go out in Boats of 8 or 10
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Tons Burthen which they call ‘Spider Catchers’…”10 Songs were sung in taverns and
meeting houses heralding the accomplishments of privateers.11 The popularity of
privateering depleted the maritime labor market in the colonies; by 1780, many privateers
sailed with more landsmen on board than seamen.12 James Warren stated it best when, in
a letter to John Adams, he wrote that “the Success of those that have before Engaged in
that business has been sufficient to make a whole Country privateering mad.”13
The first-hand privateer narratives support the idea that the practice exhibited
tendencies of a gold rush phenomenon, with major surges of participants joining once the
potential gains became apparent. Of the memoirs intensively studied for this essay none
of the authors began their Revolutionary War careers as privateers. Christopher Vail and
Gideon Olmsted both joined regiments of militia upon the outbreak of war.14 Solomon
Drowne was trained as a surgeon, and supported the American army in that capacity
during the Siege of New York in 1776 and later at the Rhode Island Hospital.15 Prince
and Sherburne were sailors by trade before joining privateers. Prince actually began the
war in British custody, fighting under duress for the British in the St. Lawrence River in
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1775, while Sherburne saw his first service aboard the Continental warship Ranger in
1779.16 It is likely, then, that some of the authors may have been enticed away from other
lines of work by the financial opportunities offered by privateers. The introduction to
Olmsted’s journal written by Gerard W. Gawalt even states that “in April 1776 young
Olmsted mustered out of the army, eager for the spoils of privateering.”17
Recruiting tactics by privateers emphasized the financial windfall that could result
from joining a cruise. An advertisement from the town of Wethersfield sought to recruit
“All Gentlemen Volunteers who are desirious [sic] of making their fortunes in eight
weeks.”18 Another offered signing bonuses of nearly $100 dollars to new recruits—$60
more than the Continental Navy would pay.19 These advertisements were often posted in
taverns to attract sailors. One even asked interested participants to come to the wharf
where they would be “treated with that excellent Liquor called GROG, which is allowed
by all true seamen, to be the LIQUOR OF LIFE.”20
Andrew Sherburne’s account gives a valuable description of how he was recruited
into privateering. In December of 1780 Sherburne found himself in Portsmouth and
planned to ship out with the Continental ship Alexander. However, as he describes it:
I was walking the street one day, and being in a seaman’s garb, was
readily recognised as a sailor and was overtaken by a jolly tar, who
accosted me in the following manner. “Ha, shipmate, don’t you wish to
take a short cruise in a fine schooner and make your fortune?” I replied

16

Christopher Prince, Autobiography of a Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince and the American
Revolution, ed. Michael J. Crawford (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), 34-6; Andrew Sherburne,
Memoirs of Andrew Sherburne: A Pensioner of the Navy of the Revolution (Providence: H.H. Brown,
1831), 19-21. https://archive.org/details/sherburnememoirs00sherrich.
17
Olmsted, Journal of Gideon Olmsted, xi.
18
Helen Augur, The Secret War for Independence (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955), 95.
Emphasis in original.
19
Robert H. Patton, Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American
Revolution (New York: Random House, 2008), 114.
20
Augur, Secret War for Independence, 96.

44

that I expected to sail in the Alexander. “O we shall get back,” said he,
“before the Alexander will get ready to sail.”21
Convinced by the “jolly tar’s” encouragement, Sherburne joined with the privateer
Greyhound, Captain Jacob Wilds. The ship, however, was still undermanned, so the
Greyhound docked at York in an effort to recruit more sailors. Upon arriving, Captain
Wilds “laid a plan to get up a frolic at the public house, and suitable persons were
employed to invite the lads and lasses for a country dance.” With the liquor flowing and
the sailors dancing, Sherburne states that “every art and insinuation was employed by the
officers to obtain recruits.”22
Most of the proceeds from privateer expeditions came from the sale of prizes and
their cargoes, which had to be legitimated by the decision of a prize court. Privateers had
to deal with prize courts throughout the early modern period, as discussed in Chapter
One. In the Revolution, though, the process was more complicated; prize courts were not
in place before the war. After creating his fleet of schooners George Washington learned
that he was responsible for judging prize cases of ships captured by the fleet. He begged
Congress to establish legal prize courts for the captures, “as we are rather groping in the
dark till this happens.”23 Washington’s prize agents too struggled to satisfy the privateers,
who expected quick returns on their captures.24 Prize courts were a frequent nuisance to
privateers as they delayed the acquisition of profit from a successful cruise.
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Prize courts were set up by both individual colonies and Congress from 1775
onward, but with the haphazard nature of their establishment and the immense number of
prizes sent to them for adjudication, they fell hopelessly behind on their work.25 It was
not uncommon for prize cases to be officially decided long after the conclusion of the
war. Captain Gustavus Conyngham was forced to sell his ship after his prize cases stalled
upon his return to American in 1779. Eighteen years later, he was still seeking back pay
and prizes from Congress.26 Gideon Olmsted’s case was not resolved until thirty years
after the capture of the ship in question.27 The immense amount of activity among the
prize courts during the war, as well as the frequent disagreements over prize money
distribution, illustrate the high importance privateers placed on profiting from their
cruises.
The perception of privateering’s profitability was supported by success stories
from the practice. Though some privateers ended up imprisoned, impressed, or destitute
by the end of the war, others made their fortunes. Christopher Prince had a remarkably
successful career as a privateer sailing out of Connecticut ports. His first cruise aboard
the sloop American Revenue resulted in the capture of the British ship Lovely Lass. The
sale of the Lovely Lass and her cargo netted the crew $200,000, of which Prince’s share
was an even two thousand. Upon hearing how much money his son made Prince’s father
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exclaimed, “Why, there is not ten men in Massachusetts can spare as much money to
their country as you.”28 Prince continued to sail in privateers throughout the rest of the
war, and through his earnings was able to purchase property for himself and his wife
outside of New London. The property was estimated to be worth around 30,000 dollars.29
In some cases it only took one good cruise to make a successful privateer.
Christopher Vail had a modest if unspectacular career as a privateer for much of the war,
gaining prize money from a few captures and spending time as a prisoner in Antigua.
Near the end of the war Vail found himself on board a privateer scouring the coasts of
Rhode Island and Connecticut for prizes. His privateer stopped a British vessel claiming
its cargo as “flour, flax, and iron.” When Vail and his crewmates inspected closer,
however, “by some means or other the flour had turned into inkstands.”30 The total cargo
was worth 4,000 pounds sterling; Vail had become a rich man.31 The success stories of
privateering demonstrate the potential for amassing one’s fortune through the practice.
The thirst for wealth that helped to bolster privateering ventures in the war,
though, also had its flipside. At times, the drive for profit obstructed all other motivations
and logic. Washington dealt with profit-hungry privateers firsthand. In October 1775,
President John Hancock ordered Washington to send ships to intercept two ordnance
vessels that were said to be on their way to Quebec with “Arms and Powder.”32
Washington turned to his fleet of schooners for the job, sending the Hancock, Captain
Nicholson Broughton, and the Franklin, Captain John Selman, to hunt down the British
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ships. Washington gave Broughton specific instructions to “make all possible Dispatch
for the River St. Lawrence” in order to intercept the ships. Additionally, should they have
to deal with any Canadians, they were to “treat [them] with all Kindness and by no
Means suffer them to be injured or molested.”33
Broughton spectacularly failed to follow any of Washington’s instructions. While
he and Selman sailed northward, they captured multiple prizes of dubious legitimacy. 34
Instead of sailing into the St. Lawrence, Broughton and Selman set sail for
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. The privateers, eager for the spoils of war,
plundered the town and captured the town leaders including acting-Governor Phillip
Callbeck. In a letter to Lord Dartmouth, court clerk John Budd claimed the American
privateersmen “stript Mr. Callbeck…and me of every thing we were possessed of in the
world.”35 Callbeck was led to believe that Broughton and Selman were not privateers, but
pirates – “and by their Conduct,” he wrote, “they were actually such.” He went on to
describe the “Wanton & flagrant outrages” committed by the privateersmen, including
the seizure of all of Callbeck’s assets.36 The direct disobedience of his captains infuriated
Washington; upon their return, Broughton and Selman were heavily censured, and their
newfound fortunes confiscated.
Privateering’s popularity during the war is not in question. It was a gold rush
phenomenon, a way for Americans in the seaport towns and in the countryside to make a
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profit during the war against the British. Recruiters emphasized the potential fortunes,
and prize courts struggled to keep up with the constant influx of new prizes. For some,
the allure of wealth obstructed everything else about privateering. The profit motive for
privateering does effectively describe some of the factors driving the phenomenon during
the American Revolution, and thus deserves a place in any investigation of privateering.
Yet while privateering was clearly influenced by the allure of profit, it was not
solely an economically driven activity. An example from the sacking of Charlottetown
described earlier illustrates some of the deeper motivations. During the plundering, the
American sailors took the time to look in particular for Mrs. Callbeck “for the
purpose…of cuting her throat, because she is the Daughter of a Mr. Coffin at Boston,
who is remarkable for his attatchment to Government.”37 Why did the American
privateersmen put their plundering on hold to look for an innocent woman, just because
she had a second-degree attachment to someone involved in the British government in
Boston? There was clearly a great deal of anger involved, anger directed at Britain and its
symbols of power. Privateering offered not only a means to profit; it offered beleaguered
sailors in the colonies the chance to strike a blow against what they perceived as the
unjust imposition of British rule upon their livelihoods.
A Revolutionary Resistance: Privateering and Liberties
In March of 1765, Parliament passed the Stamp Act, which placed a tax on all
paper products used in the colonies. The tax was part of Parliament’s plan to recoup the
debt accrued in fighting the Seven Years’ War. It was not well received in the colonies,
particularly in Boston, where British General Thomas Gage complained of an
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“Insurrection…composed of great numbers of Sailors headed by Captains of Privateers,
and other ships.”38 Boston was not unique; up and down the American coast, sailors and
dock workers took the lead in resisting British authority during the 1760s and 1770s.
Nearly every major case of riotous resistance to the British in an American seaport city
involved sailors, wharf hands, and dock workers.39
Many of the individuals involved in port riots before the war joined privateering
crews during the Revolution, evidence of a clear connection between pre-war forms of
resistance and the practice of privateering. This section will analyze those connections in
two ways. First, both pre-war rioters and wartime privateers were driven by anger over
Britain’s imposition in the economic affairs of American colonists. Second, both pre-war
rioters and wartime privateers fought back against the policy of impressment and
imprisonment of American sailors. Privateering was then an outgrowth of previous

38

Thomas Gage, The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage, ed. Clarence Edwin Carter, vol. 1 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), 71.
39
Jesse Lemisch was one of the first to investigate the sailors’ role, contending that they were politically
motivated acts of riotous resistance; see Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the
Politics of Revolutionary America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 25, no. 3 (July 1968), 371-407.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1921773. Marcus Rediker built off of Lemisch’s work, arguing that sailors and
the “motley crew” were the driving forces behind the American Revolution and drove upper-class elites to
go along with their rebellious acts; see Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, The Many-Headed Hydra:
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press,
2000), 211-47. https://goo.gl/jQmP6j. Christopher Magra supports Rediker and Linebaugh, focusing his
work specifically on the seaport town of Marblehead and looking at the impact the Fisheries Bill had on
sailor resistance; see Christopher P. Magra, “Anti-Impressment Riots and the Origins of the Age of
Revolution,” International Review of Social History 58, no. S21 (2013), 131-51.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/ejournals/article/312651041; see also Christopher P. Magra, “The New England
Cod Fishing Industry and Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution,” Enterprise & Society 8, no.
4 (December 2007), 799-806. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23700768; see also Christopher P. Magra,
“’Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’: Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts, and the Origins and Progress of the
American Revolution,” The New England Quarterly 77, no. 4 (December 2004), 531-62.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559726. In his work Paul Gilje pushes back against Lemisch, Rediker, and
Magra, stating that any “class consciousness” assigned to sailors “needs to be carefully qualified.” He
believes that sailors were influenced more by opportunities for their own personal economic gain than a
fight for a broader sense of national liberty. See Paul A. Gilje, “Loyalty and Liberty: The Ambiguous
Patriotism of Jack Tar in the American Revolution,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic
Studies 67, no. 2 (April 2000), 165-93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27774256; see also Paul A. Gilje,
Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

50

instances of collective action and resistance to British authority, and not an isolated,
solely profit-driven phenomenon. While American rioters and privateers displayed
elements of collective action, it should be noted that their actions are not a sign of a
coalescence of American identity; they had a stronger conception of what they were
fighting against—perceived unjust imposition of British imperial authority—than what
they were fighting for.
Economic Resistance
After the French and Indian War, Parliament passed a series of new taxes on the
American colonies in an effort to pay off the debt accrued in that conflict, and increased
their enforcement of those tariffs. These policies had their greatest effect on the merchant
sphere, and as a result impacted the sailors that worked merchant shipping routes. Sailors
responded with collective violence targeting British commercial property to demonstrate
their ire for the new laws. Privateers were the natural outgrowth of these forms of
collective violence, taking their attacks against British commercial property to sea.
One of the first Parliamentary laws levied against the American colonists was the
Stamp Act of 1765. Sailors responded with collective vehemence. As previously cited,
General Thomas Gage spoke of the mob of sailors that accumulated in Boston to resist
the act. To respond to the increasing unrest Gage requested “a legal Pretence to collect all
the Force I could, into one Body; which might Check in some Measure the Audacious
Threats of taking Arms…”40 In Newport, Rhode Island, resistance among seamen was
also pronounced. The port was a haven for smugglers, sailors, and former privateersmen,
and as a result the Newport colonists took particular offense to the stricter enforcement of
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customs laws. In 1764, colonists seized a battery on Goat Island to fire upon the British
ship Squirrel. That same year, sailors from Newport seized a longboat from the British
ship Maidstone and burned it on the town commons.41 Stamp Act resistance occurred in
the southern colonies as well; Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh cite an incident in
Charleston, South Carolina, where “a mob of sailors wearing black face and masks”
stormed the home of merchant Henry Laurens to destroy stamped paper rumored to be in
his possession.42 Sailor protests like these were in direct response to British imposition
upon American commercial trade, and were a form of resistance to British economic
authority over the colonies.
The mobs and riots organized as a resistance to British economic authority were
not random acts of violence, but were directed attacks against British property and
commerce. Some of the main targets of these groups were British customs officials and
sympathizers. In a riot that occurred in New York City in 1765, sailors and privateers
assembled to resist the Stamp Act. The riot began in the center of town, an area Jesse
Lemisch describes as “rich for plunder.”43 Rather than seize property from that area, the
mob of sailors travelled clear across the city to raid the home of an English major.44 In
Boston, Thomas Gage claims that “a Ship…with Ten Boxes of Stampt Papers on
Board…was boarded in the Night by a Number of Armed Men, who took away the
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Boxes, and burned them on the Shore.”45 The Boston Massacre of 1770 began just
outside the town’s Customs House. Perhaps the most famous example of pre-war
resistance was the Boston Tea Party, where sailors and members of the Sons of Liberty
destroyed British property, throwing boxes of tea into the harbor in resistance to the new
taxes on tea. The actions of sailors before the war were not motivated by plunder; they
were acts of resistance targeting British restrictions on American commercial activity.
With the outbreak of war in 1775 attacks on British commercial property took on
a new form: privateering. American privateers almost exclusively targeted British
maritime property, making them enticing options for American tars to strike a blow at
British commercial dominance. There were admittedly numerous practical reasons for
privateers’ focus on merchant vessels. Merchant ships were often weakly defended—or at
least, had less firepower than ships of the Royal Navy—and had more valuable cargoes.
But while merchant vessels offered more opportunities for prize money, they also served
as representations of the British Empire’s commercial might. The hated economic
policies placed on the American colonies were enacted to protect British ships. It only
made sense, then, that these were the ships targeted by American sailors. Privateering
was an outgrowth of pre-revolution resistance to British economic practices, an escalation
of economic resistance by American seamen. It was popular not just for the prospects of
financial gain, but also the promise of striking back against Britain in the very areas that
caused much of the antagonism between the two sides in the first place.

45

Gage, Correspondence of Thomas Gage, vol. 1, 82.

53

Social Resistance and Impressment
Impressment was a constant bogeyman in the life of the eighteenth-century
Atlantic sailor. It was used by the Royal Navy to crew warships; they would seize sailors
from merchant ships or seaports belonging to the Empire and force them to serve aboard
His Majesty’s vessels.46 American colonists perceived the practice as an unjust
imposition of British authority upon their personal liberties. It was cited as a major
grievance between the colonies and Britain in Thomas Paine’s influential pamphlet
Common Sense, as well as the Declaration of Independence.47 The most vociferous group
fighting against the policy of impressment, though, were the sailors targeted by the
practice. Before the war, they used riots and other smaller-scale forms of collective
violence to push back against a practice they believed robbed them of their personal
liberties. While privateering in and of itself was not a form of resistance to impressment,
Revolutionary sailors took part in privateering to express their personal liberties and
fought ardently against the British authorities when their liberties were taken away, either
through impressment or imprisonment.
Sailors did not jump at the chance to serve in the Royal Navy. One sailor serving
aboard a warship commented, “I was surprised to see so few who, like myself, had
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chosen [naval service] for the love of that line of life.”48 Enlistments were long at best
and ambiguous at worst. A sailor in the Royal Navy could spend multiple years aboard a
ship with little-to-no time off-vessel and no clear idea when his service would conclude.49
Discipline in the Royal Navy was harsh, with minor offenses receiving a whipping and
major offenses like desertion punishable by death. Sailors in the Navy faced a greater risk
of death in battle and a lower chance of profiting from their time aboard ship.50 With few
incentives to serve in the Royal Navy, it is unsurprising that finding willing volunteers to
man warships was a challenge. Despite the hatred of the practice, there is little doubt that
impressment was legal; the Admiralty was even willing to take the matter to court to
prove its legitimacy.51 With no recourse to legal challenge against the practice, American
sailors looking to defend their personal liberty took up more aggressive tactics to stave
off impressment.
Resistance to impressment was more haphazard than that against British
economic influence; it could take the form of a large-scale riot or a small-scale but
targeted act of violence. The most striking example of the former occurred in Boston in
1747, and came to be known as the Knowles Affair. After a number of sailors deserted
his ship British Commodore Knowles resorted to the press to man his vessel, picking up
forty-six sailors. In response a mob of “three hundred Seamen and Strangers” seized four
officers from Knowles’ ship as hostages. By end of the day, the mob had grown to some
four thousand members of the town who destroyed the windows of the Town House and
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burned a barge that was in the harbor.52 Massachusetts Governor William Shirley was
able to defuse the situation and regain control of the city from the mob three days later,
but the Knowles Riots would remain the largest public uprising in Boston until the Stamp
Act. If the figure of four thousand is accurate, nearly a quarter of Boston’s population
took part in the Knowles Affair. The event also sparked a young Boston patriot named
Samuel Adams to write the Independent Advertiser, where he connected the sailors’
resistance to impressment with notions of republican virtues.53
The Knowles Affair was an outstanding event; more often, resistance to
impressment was exhibited in smaller confrontations between impressed sailors and
British officers. A notable example of this took place in 1769, when a press gang from
the Rose, Captain Benjamin Caldwell, attempted to impress four Marblehead sailors from
the Pitt Packet as they returned to their home port. The sailors resisted, and during the
ensuing struggle one of the sailors, Michael Corbet, killed British Lieutenant Henry
Panton with a harpoon.54 According to John Adams, who tried Corbet’s case, Corbet
perceived that the press gang was coming to “deprive me of my liberty.”55 Many
American sailors would have agreed with Corbet that impressment was a violation of
their own personal liberties and an egregious imposition on the part of British authorities.
During the Revolutionary War many American privateersmen faced the tyranny
of impressment. Like their fellow sailors before the war, they resisted service aboard
vessels of the Royal Navy, though they were often unsuccessful in doing so. Andrew
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Sherburne was impressed on board the British sloop-of-war Fairy and ordered to serve on
the foretop, a service Sherburne refused. Though he managed to avoid service up top, he
grimly took up service in the waist after “very hard words and several threats.”56
Christopher Vail was impressed aboard the 74-gun Suffolk, and like Sherburne refused to
man quarters during combat. The captain threatened to “flog any man to the gangway”
who would not fight, but never carried out these threats.57 When Vail was transferred to
the Action and again refused to fight, the captain was less inclined to mercy; one
American was whipped so much he was “cut into a jelly.”58 Joshua Davis was impressed
into British service on six different occasions. He tried to avoid impressment by claiming
to be a prisoner of war, at which point a British lieutenant called him “a d—d yankee
rascal,” and threatened to “tie [Davis] up to the gangway and give [him] a dozen of
lashes.”59 Though many privateers wound up doing service in the British Royal Navy
during the war, their efforts to resist the practice demonstrate their similarities and
sympathies with pre-war acts of collective action against impressment.
Beyond impressment, many American privateersmen were also imprisoned during
the war. Again perceiving such imprisonment as a violation of their social liberties,
privateersmen worked to escape from prison and get back to sea. In his journal
Christopher Vail describes five different escape plans he and the other American sailors
attempted during their captivity at Antigua.60 Sherburne cites an event when a full dozen
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prisoners escaped from Old Mill prison during his internment there.61 In some cases,
American prisoners would make arrangements with British guards to escape for a few
days, then return to prison.62 Imprisonment, like impressment, was perceived by
American privateersmen as an unfair restriction on their social liberty. While the practice
of privateering itself was not wholly driven by the fight against impressment, the actions
of privateersmen throughout the war demonstrate a strong streak of resistance, a desire to
fight for their own liberties, and a familiarity with pre-war forms of protest like the
impressment riot.
Privateering and National Identity?
I have demonstrated in this chapter that American privateersmen saw privateering
as a means to resist British authority. They attacked British commercial property at sea in
resistance to Britain’s imposition of tariffs and taxes before the war. They struggled
against restrictions upon their social liberty by refusing to serve in the Royal Navy and
attempting to escape from British prisons. In their acts of resistance to British authority,
were privateersmen motivated by a fight for the greater good of their country? Did they
develop a sense of “American-ness” in their wartime actions? Privateersmen certainly
knew what they were fighting against; they were fighting the imposition of British
authority upon their own lives. But in terms of what they were fighting for, the
motivation of privateersmen is more ambiguous.
Primary source evidence from Revolutionary privateersmen abounds with antiBritish sentiment. During his time impressed aboard a British warship Christopher Vail
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complained about the arrogance and haughtiness of the sailors, and mocked them when
they were defeated by a French vessel.63 Andrew Sherburne stated that serving “his
Britannic Majesty” was something that he had “detested from [his] infancy.”64
Christopher Prince’s memoir in particular is invaluable in investigating the ways
American privateersmen perceived the British, for in his narrative we can see his attitude
toward the British change over time. His Uncle Job had close connections to many of the
British officers stationed in Boston, and Prince himself knew many of the navy sailors.
However, after witnessing a riot put down by the British, he stated that he “began to have
some unfavorable feelings and sentiments towards the proceedings of the English…”65
When Prince informs his reader of the conflict at Lexington and Concord, he states that
“sixty five were killed, and many wounded,” and that “fifty of our countrymen were
killed and wounded.”66 After sailing to Canada Prince was forced to serve aboard a
British vessel. He acquiesced but adamantly maintained that he “could not consent to lift
a finger against [his] country.”67 Prince’s narrative demonstrates that during the
Revolutionary War American privateersmen perceived their opponents in a negative
light, and even began to see themselves as distinctly different from the British.
Though privateersmen had strong anti-British sentiments, the extension of that
idea—that privateers had a distinctly American identity and fought for the cause of the
Revolution—is dubious. Though some of the privateer memoirs mention “the cause of
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freedom” when discussing their motivations, those works were written well after the
conclusion of the Revolution, after America was an established nation with a national
identity of its own.68 During the Revolution proper, there was little clarity over exactly
what it meant to be “American” anywhere in the colonies. Many patriots identified more
with their colony rather than a greater American nation. In his analysis of national
motivations and sailors of the Revolution Paul Gilje surmises that “loyalty to hometowns
often transcended nation or state.”69 The self-identification of privateers is a difficult
argument to defend one way or the other. However, what is clear is that while the
privateers may not have had a clear sense of American-ness, they did position themselves
against what they perceived as British tyranny. There was a clear sense of “us versus
them” in privateering, even if there was some ambiguity on exactly who “us” was.
Though privateers may not have been motivated by a devotion to the ideals of an
American nation, they were driven by anger at British rule. They chafed under British
authority over their economic and social liberties, resisting through tax riots and
impressment. Analyzing the actions of American privateersmen during the Revolution in
conjunction with examples of collective resistance by sailors before the conflict
demonstrates that the two practices were motivated by similar factors. Privateering
offered American colonists the chance to strike back at British authority and, in doing so,
fight for their own economic and personal liberties, if not the liberty of their country.
Conclusion
Christopher Prince may have described a privateer’s motivation best when he
stated that “Through the whole course of the war I have had two motives in view, one
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was the freedom of my country, and the other was the luxuries of life.”70 Privateer sailors
were in part motivated by the allure of profits and the promises of financial gain to be had
from privateering. In a way, it was America’s first gold rush. The profit narrative for
privateering is not entirely inaccurate; however, it does not tell the whole story behind the
motivation for the practice. Sailors saw Revolutionary War privateering as an outgrowth
of pre-war forms of resistance, as a means to fight back against British restrictions on the
American sailors’ economic and social liberty. The motivation for privateering is closely
related to that of the tax riot and the fight against impressment. It was a fight for liberty—
not the liberty of a whole country, but the liberty of an individual against the tyranny of
an unjust, imperial ruler.
As I have argued throughout this thesis, the profit-narrative does not cover all
aspects of privateering during the American Revolution. There was an ideological
motivation for the practice. For American privateersmen, that ideology manifested in the
form of resistance to British authority over their economic and social liberties. Privateer
sailors, though, were only one part of the privateering equation; on the other side were
the investors, the merchants and patriots that funded privateer expeditions. These men,
and the ideological underpinnings behind their involvement in privateering, will be the
focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE: PRIVATEER INVESTORS AND THE
IDEOLOGIES OF REPUBLICANISM

In the early months of the Revolution, Congress and individual colonial
governments sought support for the war from their citizens. They called upon American
patriots to serve in the militias and devote themselves to the cause of freedom. From
more affluent members of society, governments sought donations of property and
materiel to fight the war. One such wealthy individual was John Brown, the bombastic
Rhode Island merchant and patriot that led the attack on the Gaspee in 1772. Rhode
Island Governor Nicholas Cook had asked Brown to donate his sloop Caty to the public
service to protect Narragansett Bay from British ships. Brown refused, complaining that
“its unreasonable that the publick should Desire me to sacrifise all my private Interest for
the Benefit of the common Cause.”1 He would, however, lease the Caty to the
government, provided they paid for the necessary repairs.2
John Brown’s concerns over his own private interest in relation to the public good
was a critical component of the privateering phenomenon for the American merchants
and investors who supported the practice. Whereas the documents left by privateersmen
make almost no mention of morality, the correspondence of elites is rife with
considerations of morality, legality, and virtuosity. For Revolutionary elites, privateering
was seen within the context of a broader debate on the nature of republicanism and the
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future construction of the new American nation. On one side were those who espoused
the classical republican virtue of disinterestedness and sacrifice to the public
commonwealth; to these patriots, privateering was an abhorrent practice irreparably
tarred with immorality, unscrupulousness, and avarice—vices that had no place in a
virtuous republic. Those who supported privateering built off a different strand of
republican thought, arguing that by pursuing their own private interest through
privateering investments they were, in fact, aiding the cause of the public good. For
investors privateering could not be characterized solely as profit-driven; they had to
defend their actions as supportive of the revolutionary cause and republican ideology.
The debate among American patriots regarding the morality of privateering has
been covered by Michael J. Crawford in his excellent article “The Privateering Debate in
Revolutionary America.” This chapter seeks to build on his work by framing that debate
within the larger ideological discourse over public and private interest and the importance
of those terms to republicanism and the American identity writ large. The vast majority
of the sources in this chapter come from correspondence written by elites, a term I use to
classify the upper-echelon of revolutionary American society including statesmen,
politicians, and members of the commercialized mercantile class. Many of the documents
are found in the Naval Documents of the American Revolution series, along with archival
materials from the John Brown and Nathanael Greene papers housed in the Rhode Island
Historical Society. The chapter will begin by discussing how notions of republicanism,
commerce, liberty, and virtue were contextualized in the Revolutionary period. I will then
place privateering within that debate, outlining the arguments of those who were against
the practice as well as those in favor of it. The chapter will conclude with a case study of
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General Nathanael Greene to show in practice how gentlemen who were at the same time
patriots and investors managed to marry their devotion to the American republic and its
idealized conception with their own self-interests.
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commerce: The Great Debate
The writings of America’s Founding Fathers are awash with notions of
republicanism and liberty, cast in the mold of the new nation they hoped to build. But as
John Adams wrote, “there is not a more unintelligible word in the English language than
republicanism.”3 American patriots debated at length the necessary prerequisites for a
virtuous republic, and how to instill those necessities within an independent America.
The primary debate this thesis is concerned with is the place of commerce within a
republic. Many intellectuals saw republicanism through the classical perspective of
sacrifice to the public commonwealth, but the rising importance of commerce to the
American nation—not least to the many merchants involved in the Revolution—made the
sacrifice of personal interest an impractical goal. Understanding the broad debate on
republicanism and commerce is crucial to understanding the frameworks with which
elites approached their investments in privateering.
Notions of republicanism in the Revolutionary period built off of a rich
intellectual debate that found its origins in the ancient Roman Republic and the actions of
“the great hero of republican mythology,” Brutus.4 The Renaissance revived discussions
of republicanism, largely with Niccolo Machiavelli’s Discourses and his admiration of
virtu. Virtue was the key component of republicanism, though its meaning varied from
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thinker to thinker. To some, virtue referred to the “fulfillment of ethical endeavor in
public life and public action.”5 Others built off Machiavelli’s vision of virtue that placed
“courage and resolution before ethical scruples.”6 English republicans of the seventeenth
century emphasized republicanism as resistance to tyranny while synthesizing
Machiavellian and classical republican notions of virtue.
By the time of the Revolution American republicans cherished the notion of
disinterestedness as a republican virtue. John Adams—who later wrote a three-volume
work on republicanism—summarized the position of these Americans when he said:
There must be a possitive Passion for the public good, the public Interest,
Honour, Power, and Glory, established in the Minds of the People, or there
can be no Republican Government, nor any real Liberty. And this public
Passion must be Superiour to all private Passions. Men must be ready,
they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their private
Pleasures, Passions, and Interests, nay their private Friendships and
dearest Connections, when they Stand in Competition with the Rights of
society.7
The liberty lauded by Adams was “republican liberty,” which considered political activity
a necessary part of liberty.8 Most of the Founding Fathers sought to overthrow the
tyranny of British rule and create a republic of virtuous citizens who would willingly give
up their own personal interests to the greater good of the new American commonwealth.
The grand notions of disinterestedness did not fall in line with the increasing
commercialization of American society. Human nature itself tended towards selfishness
and “the pursuit of power, wealth, and sensual pleasure.”9 One pamphlet released by
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American artisans in the 1760s declared that “Self-Interest is the grand principle of all
Human Actions.”10 Merchants and traders lived in pursuit of profit, expanding their own
wealth and influence. Commerce generated prosperity and wealth, which for
Montesquieu undermined the pursuit of republican virtue by replacing that virtue with
ambition for profit, extravagance, and “degrading luxury.”11 The concerns over
commerce in republicanism reflected the antipathy between the commercialized classes
and the landowning, aristocratic elites. The ideas of John Locke, so cherished by
American intellectuals, “believed in the natural virtue of the owner of landed property,
who was financially independent, and whose long-term interests corresponded with those
of the nation.”12 In contrast, those who made their living in commerce would always put
their own interests over that of the national commonwealth, and thus undermine the
virtues of republicanism and the liberty they provided.
Not every intellectual saw commerce as antagonistic to liberty. Writing in the
early eighteenth century, Bernard Mandeville argued that “private vices, within the
bounds of regularly enforced laws, if left to stimulate consumption and trade, would
produce the public benefits of wealth and prosperity.”13 David Hume expanded on
Mandeville’s ideas, arguing that wealthier societies that utilized commercial activities
provided their citizens with more “industry, knowledge, and humanity,” and therefore
that commerce was a civilizing force. These ideas culminated with Adam Smith’s treatise
of political economy The Wealth of Nations, which introduced the “invisible hand”
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argument. Smith too saw merchants and traders acting in their own self-interest; however,
he argued that by promoting their own wealth they were also promoting the “publick
interest.”14 To Smith, commercial pursuits were not antagonistic to a republic’s liberty;
rather, the pursuit of private interest led to unforeseen benefits for the public good.
The idealized dream of a disinterested body of citizens sacrificing their own
interests for those of the public did not play out in the Revolution, much to the
disappointment of many American elites. Congress hoped that the militiamen comprising
the bulk of the Continental Army would stay on past their enlistments without pay. Most
soldiers refused, forcing Congress to dip into their coffers to pay enlistment bounties.15
Some soldiers even defrauded the government by enlisting twice or even three times to
receive multiple salaries.16 Accusations of selfishness extended to elites as well. Frequent
charges of corruption hounded officers of the Continental Army, particularly those in the
quartermaster position.17 Some merchants continued to trade with the British during the
war, while others drove up prices on contracts for the Continental Army. Alexander
Hamilton attacked these profiteers with typical scorn, deriding their pursuit of private
interest as “hostile to the present revolution” and stating that such men should “be
detested as traitors of the worst and most dangerous kind.”18 Throughout the colonies
individual Americans pursued their own interests rather than those of the public during
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the war, leading Washington to conclude that the small minority that “act upon Principles
of disinterestedness are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the Ocean.”19
The debates over republicanism, liberty, and commerce engaged intellectuals
throughout the early modern era. Many thinkers saw republican virtue as the sacrifice of
one’s private interests to the public good, believing the disinterestedness of the citizens
was the foundation of a virtuous republic. These classical republican ideals clashed with
the commercial pursuits of American merchants, who sought to acquire wealth for their
own private gain. Other intellectuals argued that by pursuing their own interests,
merchants and commercialized classes were in fact supporting the public interest.
The battle-lines of the republicanism debate were the framework through which
privateering investments were viewed during the American Revolutionary War. Many
patriots saw privateering as a pursuit of private interest instead of devotion to the
commonwealth, and derided the practice as anti-republican. Merchants and commercial
leaders who invested in privateers defended their actions as a contribution to the war
effort and, thusly, the public good. They could not describe their actions as profit-driven;
to do so would fly in the face of the dominant discourse on republican ideals. The next
two sections will apply the frameworks of the republicanism debate to consider both
positive and negative perceptions of privateering during the American Revolution.
For the Public Interest: Privateering, Avarice, and Immorality
In July 1778, New Hampshire representative to the Continental Congress William
Whipple went on a lengthy tirade regarding his negative views of privateering in a letter
to fellow New Hampshire statesman and privateer investor Josiah Bartlett:
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No kind of Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance,
and every kind of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of
people. Those who are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right
and wrong, and for want of an opportunity of gratifying their insatiable
avarice with the property of the Enemies of their Country, will without the
least compunction seize that of her Friends…Those people who have the
most influence with Seamen think it their interest to discourage the Public
service, because by that they promote their own interest, viz.,
Privateering.20
Whipple’s statements synthesize the broad scope of arguments against privateering
during the American Revolution. Those republicans who cherished the public interest
looked down upon privateering as little more than theft and avarice. They complained
that privateers stole crew and supplies from the Continental Navy, itself an instrument
serving the public good in fighting the British at sea. Other privateer naysayers latched
onto the unruliness and despicability of privateering, arguing that the practice was unfit
for use by a moral and upstanding republic the likes of which America was attempting to
create. To this crowd of elites, privateering was a practice founded on avarice, greed, and
immorality, one that placed the private interest above that most virtuous of pursuits, the
public good.
Privateers in Competition with the Continental Navy
Once the war began, the American colonists quickly realized they needed ships to
fight the British. Congress slowly moved towards the creation of a navy in October 1775,
but before any Continental ships sailed colonies sent out their own privateers to attack
British trade. For the remainder of the war, privateers and the Continental Navy would
compete for limited resources of sailors, supplies, and weapons available in the colonial
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seaports. Numerous American elites saw the competition in terms of public and private
interest; where the Continental Navy served the public commonwealth, privateers served
no one but their investors.
While there was no shortage of patriotic spirit in the colonies, there were only so
many men willing to go to sea during the Revolutionary War. As I demonstrated in
Chapter Two, sailors often preferred sailing in privateers rather than the Continental
Navy due to the perceived financial advantages in prize money and wages offered by
investors. Privateers would even seek to recruit from the Navy; Andrew Sherburne was
nominally a sailor in the navy when he joined his first privateer, the Greyhound.21 In
March 1776 the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety attempted to discourage “wicked &
ill-disposed persons” from encouraging sailors to desert the service. They passed an act
stipulating punishments of fines “not exceeding Fifty nor less than Thirty Dollars” or
“three months imprisonment” for harboring deserters.22
Such sanctions did little to stop the flood of seamen from joining privateers and
eschewing the Continental Navy. Esek Hopkins, Commodore of the Navy, complained to
Congress almost daily about the difficulties in manning his vessels. In September of 1776
he wrote that the frigates Providence and Warren “will be ready for Sea in a week or 10
days,” but continued on to describe how “it will be very difficult to mann any of them
without you will make the Chance of Prize Money as good as they get in the
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Privateers.”23 A month later Hopkins ran into the same problem trying to man the
Columbus and the Providence (for her second cruise), writing to the Marine Committee
that he expected “to meet with great difficulty in getting Men – the Privateers being so
plenty, and having great Success that the Men look on their Shears [shares] better than
what they have in the Navy.”24
When Hopkins’ appeals came to naught, prize agent John Langdon stepped in. He
wrote to John Hancock, then-President of the Continental Congress, that he was “verry
fearful we shall not have a hand left on board…there being the Greatest Demand for
Officers & Seamen to Man the Privateers.”25 Not two days later Langdon wrote another
letter, this one to William Whipple, showing his exasperation:
For Mercy sake let something be done immediately or our Ship will never
go to Sea, I do not expect to have one Man left in few days In short them
want to be excused, as they have great offers every Day in the Privateering
way there is scarce now one single man out of employ fit for Midshipman
Privateers every Day calling for Men—26
Eventually Congress did issue embargoes on privateering, preventing any private vessels
from leaving port until the public ships had been manned. Investors petitioned to have
them removed, but were told that “the public good must be prefer’d to private interest.”27
That stance was apparently difficult to maintain; the embargoes proved largely
ineffective and were lifted after four months.28
There was also a limited supply of gunpowder and weapons in the American
ports; privateers and the Continental Navy clashed over these resources. The demand
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grew so great that some privateers went to sea “with what they dig up on Wharfs and at
the Corner’s of Streets.29 The Continental Navy did not have such a luxury; they needed
larger complements of guns to stand toe-to-toe with British warships. However, due to
extraordinary demand prices on weapons were exorbitant; Commodore Hopkins
complained to the Marine Committee that “any Small Carriage Guns will now Sell at the
extraordinary Price of 400 Dollars pr Ton—“30 In the procurement of weapons, private
vessels again hampered the effectiveness of ships serving the public commonwealth.
The construction of the Continental ships Warren and Providence encompasses
the competition between privateers and the Navy, and the wider debate over private and
public interest it represented. In 1776 the Brown brothers, John and Nicholas, were hired
by Congress to construct and outfit two Continental warships, the Warren and the
Providence. The construction was repeatedly delayed, as Nicholas and John turned their
attentions to their own private vessels. They even put the best equipment on board their
own ships, leaving the two Continental vessels in despicable condition; Philadelphia
financier and statesman Robert Morris declared them “the two worst frigates” he had ever
seen.31 Once the ships were finally completed, the Browns’ privateers stole most of the
able-bodied seamen from the port, leaving the Continental vessels undermanned. Robert
Morris accused the Browns, and other wealthy Rhode Islanders, of having “sacrificed
every other pursuit to [privateering], both public and private.”32 Elites who emphasized
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service to the public good bemoaned the activity of privateers who expressly stole ships,
crew, and supplies from the vessels of the Continental Navy; they saw it as the unhealthy
triumph of private avarice over virtuous service to the public commonwealth.
Immoral and Roguish Privateers
Where some American republicans saw privateering as antagonistic to the public
interests in its competition with the Continental Navy, others saw it as harmful to public
interest in its corruption of the national character. Privateers could be an unruly, illdisciplined lot. Their attacks, even if legal, could look remarkably similar to piracy,
especially given the lax regulations on privateering in the colonies. American idealists
feared that privateers would irreparably tarnish the new republic’s reputation abroad and
sow the seeds of disunity at home, threatening the integrity and virtuosity of the
American nation.
Noted statesman and Philadelphia financier Robert Morris was firmly against
privateering at the outset of the war, believing that privateers were unbecoming of
America’s national principles. The actions of privateers struck Morris as “more of
Moorish Piracy than Christian Forbearance.” In the same letter, Morris continued:
…what shall we say for these Plunderers when Individuals, honest
Industrious Men, Friends to the Freedom & Independence of [America]
lose their Property Credit & reputation by these Depredations, & the
Misrepresentations they make to Cover their own Villainies, indeed my
good friends if we do not take some effectual measures to punish the
guilty and put a Stop to this kind of Arbitrary Thieving we shall be Sharers
in their Guilt and probably incur the Suspicion of being Sharers in the
Plunder.33
Near the end of the letter, Morris spoke to the actions of privateers in relation to the
identity of the new American republic; he feared that unless something was done to stop
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the practice, America would gain a reputation as “a lawless Set of Freebooters, which
God forbid sh[oul]d ever be the Characteristicks of the Country I love.”34 Morris’s fears
of the unruly actions of privateers convinced him that such a practice was not in the
public interest of the nation for the negative affect it would have on the nation’s
reputation.
Captain John Paul Jones was of a similar mind. A captain of great renown in the
Continental Navy, Jones was consistently infuriated with what he perceived to be the
selfish acts of privateers. In a letter to Robert Morris Jones stated that “Self
Intrest…determins all Adventurers in Privateers; the Owners as well as those whom they
employ.”35 Later in the war, Jones’ attacks on privateering and the damage it caused the
national reputation grew more spirited:
I have seen with Indignation, the sordid Adventurers in Privateers sporting
away the Sinews of our Marine…Publick Virtue is not the Characteristick
of the concerned in Privateers. No wonder then that they let their Prisoners
go, in such a manner, that they immediately augment the Strength of the
Enemies Fleet. Their selfishness furnishes them with Reasons for this
conduct; were they to keep their Prisoners, their Provision would be the
sooner consumed; which might perhaps oblige them to return home before
they had sufficiently glutted their Avarice?36
Jones saw himself a consummate patriot, putting the needs of his country before his own
self-interest; the privateers, focused on plunder and loot as they were, stood in stark
contrast to Jones’ ideals for the American nation.
To Jones and Morris, privateers damaged the national character of the American
republic; to William Hooper, they could potentially break apart the unity of the colonies.
The northern and southern colonies were unified in the cause of liberty, but had starkly
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different economies. The northern colonies had a long history of livelihood by maritime
trade, whereas southern planters focused their efforts on the cultivation of cash crops
rather than the cultivation of maritime trading networks. Most privateers, then, sailed out
of New England ports, while ships leaving the southern colonies were loaded with
lucrative cotton and tobacco and were often poorly defended. In a letter to Joseph Hewes,
Hooper spoke of “a state of general confusion” caused by the seizure of southern colonial
trading ships by northern privateers.37 Hooper feared that such transgressions could lead
to “One Part [of America] warring against another, and the defenceless Southern colonies
become a devoted prey to their more formidable Eastern neighbours.”38 The colonies
managed to remain unified under Congress during the war, but it was a fragile unity that
continual transgressions from northern privateers could jeopardize.
Hooper’s concerns were not unfounded; American privateers did on occasion
seize ships belonging to their fellow countrymen. One of Nicholas Brown’s privateers,
the Willful Murther, was accused of plundering the schooner Nightingale, owned by the
people of Nantucket. William Rotch, the primary complainant, maligned Brown for
investing in “such atrocious Villany,” and asked Brown “for impartial justice…for at
present I cannot apprehend you can acquiesce in such a conduct, nor be partaken to
interpose & assist us in justly wresting our Intrest from the hands of such wicked Men.”39
Privateer seizures of American property damaged the bonds that held the colonists
together and, as a result, damaged the united national interest of the public
commonwealth.
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American idealists, statesmen, and republicans put forward numerous arguments
against privateering, all centered on the practice’s inconsistencies with the virtue of
promoting the public good. Privateers hindered the effectiveness of the Continental
Navy—a public institution itself—by stealing potential crewmen and weapons. The
actions of privateers, it was feared, would sour America’s reputation abroad and tear
apart the unity of the Revolution at home. Those elites that cast America’s future as that
of a virtuous republic built on the disinterestedness of its citizens and the elevation of the
public good were infuriated with privateering; to them, it was the epitome of avarice and
the corrupting influence of private pursuits. The arguments against privateering were
vocal, but never practically realized; colonies continued to issue privateer commissions
quite literally until the day of the ceasefire.40
For the Private Interest: Privateering, Reprisal, and Victory
Though numerous American elites derided privateering, hundreds more happily
invested in privateer ventures during the war, and every colony and the Continental
Congress issued commissions. These investors were in part driven by financial
motivations. Privateering was a business where successful investments could net huge
profits. However, these investors also recognized the importance of republican ideals to
the Revolutionary cause; they too sought to create a virtuous republic, but did not feel
that the sacrifice of private interest to the public good was the epitome of virtue. To
defend their investments, these elites used both the discourse of reprisal as well as other
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republican arguments demonstrating how the pursuit of private wealth could benefit the
national interest and the public commonwealth.
Recall from Chapter One that early privateer expeditions justified their seizures
on the basis of reprisal. Merchants and aristocrats who had property seized by the enemy
outfitted privateers to recover their assets and recoup lost profits. Supporters of
privateering during the American Revolution used the law of reprisals to justify their own
activities with privateering. Even the names of privateer vessels suggest the notion of
reprisal; the first officially commission privateer out of Massachusetts was named the
Boston Revenge.41
The legal documents related to privateering consistently characterize it as an act
of reprisal. The Massachusetts law authorizing privateer commissions stated that the
British “are infesting the Sea Coast with Armed Vessells, and daily Endeavouring to
distress the Inhabitans, by burning their Towns…and making Captures of Provisions and
other Vessells being the Property of said Inhabitants.”42 With such attacks occurring, the
Massachusetts General Assembly believed privateering gave their citizens a chance to
recover property lost to the British. When the Continental Congress finally authorized
their own privateers, they too framed the practice in terms of reprisal. The declaration of
March 23, 1776 stated that since Britain had “declar[ed] their property, wherever found
upon the water, liable to seizure and confiscation,” Congress felt it “necessary to provide
for their defence and security, and justifiable to make reprisals upon their enemies, and
otherwise to annoy them, according to the laws and usages of Nations.”43 Couching
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privateering in the long-established tradition of reprisal gave it a greater degree of
legitimacy; it was not about acquisition of profit, some elites argued, but recovery of
property already lost to the British.
It was this notion of property recovery that encouraged Robert Morris to change
his attitudes towards privateering. Morris was originally against privateering as it
undermined the national interest and reputation abroad. In September of 1776, Morris
wrote to Silas Deane that privateering “does not square with my Principles,” and that he
did want to outfit privateers to attack British merchant ships for he “Coud not consent to
take any part of their property because the Government have Seized mine.”44 Only a few
months later, though, Morris wrote a letter to William Bingham, a former business
associate then responsible for most American privateers in the West Indies, wherein
Morris claimed that he “had determined not to be Concerned in privateering but having
had several Vessels taken from me & otherways lost a great deal of my property by this
War, I conceive myself perfectly justifiable in the Eyes of God or Man to seek what I
have lost, from those that have plundered me.”45 Interestingly Morris continued to
lambast privateering even after investing in the practice with Bingham, suggesting he still
had serious concerns regarding the legitimacy of the practice. Those concerns faded over
time; Morris would go on to become one of the most ardent investors in privateer
expeditions during the war effort, having overcome his earlier concerns by viewing
privateering as a means to recover lost property.
Privateering was consistently couched within the law of reprisal, giving it a
greater degree of legitimacy. However, the law of reprisal had loopholes as well. It was
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impossible to tell who was sailing to recover lost property, and who was sailing in pursuit
of profit. While maintaining that privateering was an act of reprisal, investors also cast
privateering as a benefit to the war effort and, as a result, the public good. The petition of
Bartholomew Putnam demonstrates such a defense of privateering:
And should she be successful – your petitioner begs leave to suggest, that
the emolument will not be merely personal & private – every instance of
success will be doubly beneficial to the Colonies, by diminishing the
wealth & strength of our enemies, and in the same proportion adding to
our own.46
As Putnam argues, privateering would indeed provide personal interest and gain to the
investors. However, by seizing British commercial property and bringing that property
into the colonies, privateers were serving the public interest by aiding the war effort.
Washington’s fleet of privateers—some of the earliest privateers in the
Revolution—were outfitted not for profit, but exclusively to benefit the public interest by
raiding British logistics.47 Having taken over the army outside of Boston, Washington
quickly realized he needed to put pressure on the British by sea as well as by land. He
acquired the Hannah from John Glover to be “the first Armed Vessell fitted out in the
Service of the United States.”48 The Hannah’s service record was unimpressive, but
Washington was undaunted. He fitted out more private warships to seize British supply
ships entering Boston harbor and capture those supplies for use among his soldiers. His
ships had a mixed record of service, but did make one capture of particular note: the
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ordnance ship Nancy, captured by Captain John Manley in the Lee. The prize provided
the American forces with much-needed weapons and powder, as well as a considerable
supply of artillery rounds.49 Though Washington had concerns over privateers, he felt that
they were worth the potential drawbacks in exchange for the support they could provide
to his army at Boston.
Massachusetts was a hotbed for privateer investment. Many of the elite merchants
and statesmen of that colony argued that privateering was an effective means to fight the
war and provided a tangible benefit to the public good. In October 1775 Elbridge Gerry
told Samuel Adams that his “attention is directed to the fitting out of privateers, which I
hope will make them swarm here.” Gerry continued on in the letter to discuss various
options for naval strategy, but surmised that “it is certain that other plans will not meet
with such success as will probably attend [privateering].” He suggested that a large group
of privateers, perhaps even working in combination with “a heavy ship or two” from
Congress, could “see the coast clear of cutters.”50 James Warren was more confident,
writing to Samuel Adams in December 1775 that “Fifteen privateers fixed out last June
would before this have put an End to the War, or at least have Obliged the Fleet and
Army to leave Boston.”51 While Warren’s claims would prove rather over-confident, his
advocacy of privateering fell in line with other prominent Massachusetts statesmen who
contended that privateering offered an ideal means for the American colonies to take the
war to the British at sea.
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The American commissioners stationed in France were another outspoken group
of privateer advocates. Their role was to establish cordial relations with France in order
to negotiate weapons shipments to the colonies and potentially forge an alliance with the
continental power. In multiple letters sent back to his superiors in the colonies, Silas
Deane pleaded with them to send blank commissions for privateers. He argued to John
Jay that “under these [commissions], infinite damage may be done, to the British
Commerce.”52 Deane’s efforts in privateering were motivated by desire to help the
American cause. Congress, however, was ever-watchful for corruption among highranking officials.53 When one of Deane’s colleagues charged him with corruption,
Congress removed him from his post, demonstrating that there were acceptable limits to
the pursuit of private interest even when inspired by devotion to the public good.54
After Deane was removed, Benjamin Franklin began outfitting his own ships.
Franklin hoped to use privateers to capture British sailors to exchange with American
prisoners, but he recognized the value in sending ships against British trade. In a letter to
Luke Ryan, one of his captains, Franklin wrote that he was “pleased with your Activity
and Bravery, in distressing the Enemy’s Trade, and beating their Vessels of superior
force by which you have done honour to the American flag.”55 The American
commissioners outfitted privateers out of European ports in the hopes that attacks on
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British commerce would help bring the war home to the British people and ultimately
help the Americans triumph.
Massachusetts statesman and future US President John Adams believed
wholeheartedly in the virtues of disinterestedness; however, he also remained an ardent
supporter of privateering throughout the war. Adams wrote that “our People may as well
fight for themselves as the Continent,” as in doing so they contributed to the fight against
the British.56 In the same letter, written to Major Joseph Ward in July of 1776, he
proclaimed that “our Privateers have the most Skill or the most Bravery, or the best
Fortune, of any in America.”57 He even wrote to his wife regarding the activity of
privateers.58 Adams was vehemently opposed to any embargoes on privateering crews, as
he described in a letter to James Warren in April 1777:
I hope your Embargo is off, before now, that the Privateers may have fair
Play. Indeed I am sorry it was ever laid. I am against all Shackles upon
Trade. Let the Spirit of the People have its own Way, and it will do
something. I doubt much whether you have got an hundred Soldiers the
more for your Embargo, and perhaps you have missed Opportunities of
taking many Prizes and several Hundreds of Seamen.59
The line regarding trade in that extract is critical; in including it, Adams ties his views on
privateering with the republican views of Mandeville and Hume regarding commerce’s
place within a virtuous republic. His enthusiasm for privateering in no way contradicts
his republican values; Adams saw privateering as a means of providing incentives to the
American people, channeling their pursuit of self-interest towards the public good.
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Privateer investors could not explain their investments as merely profit driven; to
do so would have flown in the face of prevailing winds of republicanism, virtue, and
disinterestedness. They instead characterized their investments as supportive of
republicanism. Sacrifice of private interest to the public good was not necessarily the sole
virtue of a republic, they argued; rather, one could promote and support the republic
through their private activities. In doing so they found themselves arguing for a different
form of republicanism than those against privateering, a form of republicanism that
allowed commerce and profit to play a role within the virtues of republican thought.
Nathanael Greene and Privateering in Practice
Privateering during the American Revolution was caught up in a debate on the
very nature of republicanism. One segment of elites lauded the notions of classical
republicanism, believing that sacrificing private interest for the good of the nation was
the foundation of a virtuous republic. Another group of elites moved away from the
emphasis on self-sacrifice and argued that by pursuing their own private interest they
were providing a benefit to the public good. In practice a number of privateer investors
tried to hold true to both ideas, positioning themselves as disinterested supporters of the
Revolution yet at the same time profiting from the ongoing conflict.
Nathanael Greene was one such investor attempting to marry the two sides of his
wartime activities. Greene was unquestionably a patriot and a war hero. A native Rhode
Islander, Greene joined the Kentish Guards in 1774, abandoning his peaceful Quaker
lifestyle to fight for the American cause. Once the war began in earnest, he joined the
Guards outside of Boston, where he was promoted to brigadier general of the Rhode
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Island forces.60 One of Washington’s most trusted generals, Greene was present at many
of the major battles of the Revolution including Long Island, Trenton, Princeton, and
Brandywine. After the disastrous winter at Valley Forge, Washington appointed Greene
to the post of quartermaster. Greene reluctantly accepted the position and served as
quartermaster until 1780, at which point he took command of the army in the south and
won battle after battle, helping to drive Cornwallis into Yorktown for the final blow.61
Greene’s career during the Revolution was seemingly one of devotion to the cause of his
country; as he stated in a letter to his brother Jacob in October of 1776, “it is necessary
for some to be in the field, to secure the property of others in their stores.”62
Greene’s actions while serving as quartermaster are a notable piece of the
republican-patriot narrative Greene attempted to construct. Greene did not want the
position; indeed, he attempted to refuse it before Washington convinced him that he was
needed in that role. Robert Patton quotes Greene writing to a colleague upon his
appointment stating that “All of you will be immortalizing yourselves in the golden pages
of history while I am confined to a series of drudgery to pave the way for it.”63 But while
the quartermaster position may have been a “series of drudgery,” it did bring major
financial benefits. The quartermaster was granted almost unlimited use of funds to
purchase contracts to supply the army. With few regulations in place it was a simple
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matter to funnel those funds into other, more private investments; as a result, the
quartermaster was often viewed as a corrupt official.
There is little evidence to suggest that Greene diverted an excessive amount of
public funds towards his own private endeavors, but there is plenty that he was concerned
about that perception. He assured his brother Jacob that as quartermaster he would not
“depart from the line of honor and truth in any business committed to my care,” and in
the same letter asked Jacob to “write me the public sentiments respecting transactions in
the quartermaster’s department and how the public views me.”64 The quartermaster
position offered Greene the chance to further his own private interest; however, he was
careful to demonstrate to his fellow patriots that his acceptance of the position was
motivated only by a desire to help the public good and the Revolution, and not to profit
from the war.
Such displays of disinterestedness, though, do not tell the whole story of Greene’s
character. While he was careful to avoid charges of corruption while serving as
quartermaster, Greene did profit from the position, even calling it “flattering to my
fortune” for the high wages he received.65 While service was his patriotic duty, Greene
remained jealous of the success of other businessmen, complaining to John Brown about
“those that have been at home making their fortune, and living in the lap of luxury” while
he “stood as a barrier between them and ruin.”66 During his wartime service Greene
sought to increase his own wealth through numerous investments. In particular, Greene
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worked with Jacob Greene & Co., the company he shared with his brothers, to funnel
investments into privateers.
Greene was not a prudent privateer investor. His letters strike the reader with a
tone more of a poker player than a patriot. He frequently referred to the success of
privateers on the coast as the “golden harvest,” and begged his brother to “Give me a
history of the Navigation matters,” referring to his privateer activity.67 He joined with
Barnabas Deane and Jeremiah Wadsworth to start Barnabas Deane & Co. to provide
another avenue for his privateer investments.68 By 1779 Greene had investments in some
twenty different vessels.69 Like many gamblers, Greene did not know when to walk
away. He wrote his brother that “we have been peculiarly unfortunate in Navigation; but I
am not for quiting yet. It is a long Lane that has no turn.”70
Unfortunately for Greene, his luck never picked up. Almost none of the ships in
which he had a stake managed to seize British vessels. As early as May of 1777 Jacob
wrote to Nathanael that “the Brothers Have Almost Come To A Resolution Not To
Venture To Sea Any More: as they Have Met With So Many Looses [losses] they think
they Had Better Stop Before All is Gone.”71 Matters did not improve at any time during
the war; in 1780 Jacob informed Nathanael that “The Devil Still had Got It Against us in
Navigation way.”72 Depressingly for Greene, the failures of his privateers seem to be
more due to horrendous luck than anything else. As Nathanael wrote in a letter to
Christopher Greene in January 1778:
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It seems that fortune is no freind of ours in the Privateering business. Pray
what affront have you given her ladyship? Have you been wanting in a
blind confidence in her bounty and generosity or have you insulted her by
indeavoring to take your measures from the Laws of reason or the rules of
prudence? It is almost immaterial from what quarter her displeasure
originates she is determind to be cruel. Let her go on and do her worst, we
can surmount all her embarassments by honest industry and free use of
common sense.73
Greene gambled on privateer ventures but persistent bad luck left him in serious debt
after the conflict. In 1785, with financial woes mounting, he wrote his wife that “I
tremble when I think of the enormous sums I owe. I seem to be doomed to a life of
slavery and anxiety.”74 He would die of heatstroke only a year later.
Greene was insecure about his position, trying to posture himself as a virtuous
republican patriot while still reaping the benefits of wartime investments. To that end, he
tried to hide his involvement in privateering or paint it as a service to the public good.
Greene feared the negative impact his privateer investments may have on his reputation,
asking his brother to “not to let people see my letters as they contain sentiments that I
would not wish made public.”75 His euphemisms for privateering also suggest a fear of
association; he consistently referred to his investments as “navigation matters.”76 In his
correspondence with Barnabas Deane Greene wrote about their privateer investments in
numeric code, perhaps to hide his involvement in the practice.77 In 1779 Greene advised
Colonel Samuel Webb to “keep that business [his “private concerns”] as secret as
posible,” for fear of negative reactions. Most telling is Greene’s correspondence with
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Samuel Otis, a noted privateer investor from Massachusetts. Otis offered Greene onesixteenth share in the privateer vessel Tartar in 1779. Though he had let his brothers
handle most of the on-site transactions, Greene was by this time a long-experienced
privateer investor. Yet to Otis, someone he did not know as intimately, he wrote that he
did not “wish to become an adventurer; indeed I should have little or no inclination to be
concerned in privateering, but for its being the business of my present profession, and
calculated to annoy the Enimy, and Consiquently to favor our cause.”78 To Otis, Greene
positioned himself not as a privateer enthusiast, but one who only got involved in the
practice for of the public interest.
Why was Greene so concerned with how his peers perceived his privateering
activities? Some of it comes down to his personal insecurity, but much of it relates to the
environment of republicanism in Revolutionary America. There was a large section of
American elites that held to the belief that disinterestedness and self-sacrifice were the
hallmarks of virtue in a republic. Privateer investors like Greene did not want to run
directly contradictory to that strain of thought, as republicanism and virtue were pillars of
the American Revolutionary ideology.79 Some investors tweaked their conceptions of
republicanism, arguing that pursuing their own interests did not undermine the virtue of
republican thought. Others, like Greene, chose rather to hide their investments and
construct their reputation around their perceived sacrifice to the good of the
Revolutionary cause. Had Greene’s privateer activities been widespread public
knowledge, that reputation of disinterestedness would have shattered and his loyalty to
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the ideals of republicanism and the Revolution questioned. Greene’s deception
demonstrates the rich nuances of privateering for elites in Revolutionary America.
Privateering was not simply about profit—it could not be, with the close ties between the
Revolution and republican thought. Privateer investors either had to defend their actions
on alternative views of republicanism that did not see disinterestedness as the pinnacle of
virtue, or hide their investments to protect their public devotion to republican ideals.
Conclusion
No ideology was more crucial to the American Revolution than that of
republicanism. American elites wanted to create a new virtuous republic on the Atlantic
seaboard; however, there were disagreements on what virtue meant to a republic. One
group saw disinterestedness and sacrifice of private interest to the public good as the
pivotal virtue of a republic. Others argued that this classical republican notion left no
room for commerce and trade, and instead argued that pursuit of private interest could be
directed to benefit the public good.
American elites viewed privateering through these contrasting lenses of
republicanism. Those who lauded public interest as the primary virtue despised
privateering, seeing in that practice all the vices of commerce, luxury, and avarice that
could undermine republicanism. Privateer investors defended the practice as supportive
of the public good rather than merely profitable to their own interests. Others like
Nathanael Greene tried to sit on both sides of the fence, casting themselves as a
disinterested supporter of classical republican virtues while seeking to enrich themselves
through privateering. Though investors entered privateering largely to seek a profit, they
had to place their investments within the contemporary debates on republican virtue.
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For both the sailors and the investors, privateering was not a solely profit-driven
phenomenon. In privateering, sailors saw a means to fight for their economic and social
liberties against the British authorities. Investors defended their actions within the context
of republican virtues, complicating the nature of republicanism and disinterestedness in
the Revolutionary period. The ideological components of privateering should come as no
surprise; indeed, the American Revolution was saturated with ideology. The British
brought their own ideologies to the war as well, particularly in the ideological
construction of their empire. Privateering had a role to play in this discussion as well, as
it was perceived by British observers in relation to the identity of their empire. The
perspective of the British regarding American privateers is the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BRITISH OBSERVERS AND THE
IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE

The port of Dunkirk on the northern coast of France was a thorn in the side of the
British for years. It had long been a haven for French and Dutch privateers preying on
English shipping in the Channel; the British even derisively called Channel privateers
“Dunkirkers.” As related in Chapter One, the British sought to curb the Dunkirk problem
with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, which stipulated that no privateers were allowed to sail
from that port. They even stationed observers in the harbor to monitor the situation.1 By
the time of the American Revolution Dunkirk was, in the works of historian Mark L.
Hayes, “the one port in France in which the French could not possibly get away with
accepting American privateers and prizes.”2 Imagine the surprise, then, when on May 3,
1777, American Captain Gustavus Conyngham brazenly sailed into Dunkirk with two
British prizes in tow, one of which was the lucrative Harwich packet The Prince of
Orange.
Though initially furious, British officials calmed down upon the news that France
had promptly imprisoned Conyngham upon his entry into Dunkirk. King George III
wrote to Lord North that “this is so strong a proof that the Court of Versailles mean to
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keep appearances.”3 However, among the British press Conyngham’s capture of the
Harwich packet sparked an outrage and fear that continued unabated after his
imprisonment. The London Chronicle reported that insurance rates in Holland had
jumped to “six per cent,” and suggested that Conyngham may be a pirate rather than a
privateer.4 The General Advertiser of Liverpool reported that “upwards of sixty
[privateers] were actually fitting out at Brest, Rochelle, Nantz, and other ports” to cruise
against British trade; in truth the figure was a gross exaggeration.5 Fishermen from
Penzance reported sighting a large American privateer near the harbor.6
The argument that privateering was solely profit-motivated fails to explain the
consternation from the British over American privateering. But when wider ideological
frameworks are applied to the privateering phenomenon, it becomes clear that to the
British, privateering meant more than a loss of profit; it represented an attack on the very
foundations of the British Empire. Over the course of the early modern era the British
constructed an empire that was “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free.”7 A key
component of that empire was its commercial and logistical transoceanic networks, which
were guarded by the mighty Royal Navy. American privateers targeted these very
networks, putting the Royal Navy to shame in doing so. American privateers pilfered
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British profits but, more than that, they challenged the very notion of British imperial
identity and their place in the transatlantic commercial networks upon which it was built.
The previous two chapters investigated the ideologies of Revolutionary
privateering from the American perspective, analyzing how sailors viewed privateering
as a means to economic and social liberty and how investors placed it within the
preexisting debates on republicanism and interest. This chapter flips the script by looking
at Revolutionary privateering from the British perspective, where privateering was
viewed in the context of imperial ideologies. The first part of the chapter details the
ideological foundations of the British Empire, building off of David Armitage’s helpful
summation cited above. I will then describe the ways that privateers attacked those
foundations during the American Revolution, relying on primary source newspapers and
correspondence from British observers. The chapter will conclude by considering the
American viewpoint on British ideology; American sailors and merchants were not
opposed to the presence of a vibrant transatlantic commercial maritime network, but
rather fought back against their perceived inferior place within that network. Privateering,
and the Revolution writ large, helped Americans create a new sense of “freedom” while
maintaining commercial connections with their former British countrymen.
The British Empire: An Ideological Perspective
In a speech to the House of Lords in 1707, Lord Haversham eloquently described
the maritime nature of Britain’s empire:
Your fleet and your trade have so near a relation, and such a mutual
influence upon each other they cannot be well separated; your trade is the
mother and nurse of your seamen; your seamen are the life of your fleet,
and your fleet is the security and protection of your trade, and both
together are the wealth, strength, security, and glory of Britain.8
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As an island nation, Britain had always needed a strong navy for home defense. The
expansion of the early modern Atlantic commercial system was the catalyst for the
ideological creation of the British Empire. As Britain founded more colonies overseas it
grew to rely on its maritime commerce to support growing military budgets, cement the
idea of “British-ness,” and compete with the European continental powers – namely,
France. The empire of Britain was built upon a foundation of transoceanic commercial
and logistic networks, networks that were all protected by the British Navy. The Navy,
and the commerce it guarded, became major symbols of freedom, patriotism and pride for
the new British nation. Understanding the construction of this empire is crucial to the
reader in order to grasp the ways later British observers saw privateering as a direct
attack upon these ideological foundations.
With his phrase “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free” David Armitage
suggests that Protestantism was a key underpinning of the British Empire; that aspect of
his work will not be a focus of this thesis. A religious dimension is certainly critical for a
complete analysis of the British Empire and its ideological construction, but my work
looks to connect that discourse to the actions of privateers during the Revolutionary War.
After the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, the “Protestant” moniker did not apply so
neatly to the British Empire. The Crown had gained new territories from France in
Canada and from Spain in Florida, regions that were predominantly Catholic rather than
Protestant. Linda Colley states that the conflicts between Britain and France – she
includes the Revolutionary War in this context – were “not religious but overwhelmingly
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political.”9 The privateers themselves were not likely to be extraordinarily religious
individuals either. Andrew Sherburne believed that “no other person on board prayed,”
and Christopher Prince stated bluntly that after a few months at sea, “All my religion was
gone.”10 Religion played a role in the foundation of the British Empire; however, its role
had diminished by the 1770s, and it had miniscule influence on Revolutionary privateers
and their attacks on Britain.11
Ruling over an island gave Britain’s leaders major strategic advantages as they
looked to project power outward in the early modern era. Its geographic isolation allowed
Britain to remain aloof of violent conflicts on the European continent. It was far harder
for continental powers to invade Britain than it was for them to invade other rivals on the
mainland; an invasion of Britain would require a contested amphibious assault, one of the
most challenging strategic operations. Weather could also play a role in repulsing
invasions of Britain, as was the case with the Spanish Armada invasion of 1588. But most
importantly, the nature of the British Isles meant that for home defense, Parliament and
the Crown could rely upon the navy as the main bulwark to protect its assets and citizens.
As discussed in Chapter One, in the seventeenth century England worked to move
away from a reliance on privateers and towards the construction of a state navy, one that
could both protect England’s coasts and establish its sovereignty over the seas. While the
navy grew in strength, intellectuals debated the ideas of mare liberum and mare clausum.
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The former referred to freedom of the seas, emphasizing that the sea was the “common
property of all” and could not be considered the sovereign territory of any state or ruler.12
This line of thinking was championed by Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius. The English more
often advocated the ideas of mare clausum, as discussed by John Selden in his work of
the same name. Under this principle, seas and bodies of water could be controlled and
kingdoms could treat the oceans as their dominion.13 By the end of the seventeenth
century the mare liberum policy had won out, but the temerity of the English to push for
sovereignty of the seas—seas that they would be in control of—showed their outwardlooking approach to maritime matters. As England entered the eighteenth century, the
navy would not just be a tool for defense, but a tool to project power outward through the
North Sea and into the Atlantic.
The protection and strength of the navy was crucial to the creation of Britain’s
transatlantic trade network. This network, and the commerce it facilitated, was crucial;
more than any other factor commerce was the backbone of the British Empire. Commerce
made the economy work, bringing in raw materials from the colonies for budding
industries back home in Britain. Trade tariffs and customs fees allowed the government
to profit from transatlantic commercial activity. Intellectuals saw trade as a fundamental
necessity for a successful state.14 Patriotic societies based around London in the
eighteenth century heralded the importance of commercial activity and sought to promote
“work and discoveries [that] seemed likely to benefit the economy.”15 Ideologically,
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economically, and politically, the British Empire rested on a foundation of transoceanic
maritime commercial networks; commerce was the lynchpin of the British Empire.
Commerce also served the important function of uniting the disparate entities of
the empire, both among the British Isles and the colonies overseas; author John
Chamberlayne stated it best when he proclaimed that self-interest, profits, and trade
“naturally bring people together, and keep ‘em together.”16 The idea of Britishness was
rather new in the eighteenth century, with the Act of Union creating the Kingdom of
Great Britain in 1707. The creation of the Union itself was spurred by economic issues;
Scotland’s economy was in poor shape after the failed Panama expedition, and free trade
between Scotland and England would help Scottish merchants and landowners recoup
some of their losses.17 Commerce would soon become a symbol of this new nation, a way
to tie self-interest to national loyalty and patriotism. David Armitage argues that
provincial and colonial leaders were some of the most vocal supporters of a British nation
connected through commercial networks, in that it served to “encourage equal treatment
for their compatriots” as well as bringing in considerable profit.18 Domestically, it
brought together people of varying social classes and backgrounds to take part in the
British economy. Colley suggests that “one in every five families in eighteenth-century
Britain drew its livelihood from trade and distribution,” and an even greater number
participated in industries that were reliant on commercial networks.19 A new commercial
middle class arose, and its firm relationship with the governing elites “was a vital source
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of stability” for the British Empire.20 The growth and maintenance of strong commercial
networks served to strengthen the unity of the British Empire both within the Isles and
among the periphery colonies.
At the same time, commerce emphasized the position of the ruling classes—or, to
be more accurate, the propertied classes. Property took on a symbolic, almost spiritual
importance in the eighteenth century, as Douglas Hay demonstrates:
Again and again the voices of money and power declared the sacredness
of property in terms hitherto reserved for human life. Banks were credited
with souls, and the circulation of gold likened to that of blood. Forgers, for
example, were almost invariably hanged, and gentlemen knew why:
‘Forgery is a stab to commerce, and only to be tolerated in a commercial
nation when the foul crime of murder is pardoned.’21
John Locke, one of the most influential thinkers of the Enlightenment, also heralded the
importance of property, stating that a civil society’s “chief purpose…is the preservation
of property.”22 Locke primarily discussed property in its relation to land and the
landowning elites, but the idolization of property trickled down throughout society.
Where the landowning elites saw property in the context of land and estates—items to be
inherited—the commercial merchant class saw property in commodities, items to be
bought and sold with almost reckless abandon in order to make a profit. Treating property
as a tradeable commodity brought it into the discourse of international power and
commerce. Commerce was a bulwark to the position of the ruling elites and
commercialized middle classes, reinforcing their dominant position domestically and
increasing their wealth and prestige internationally.
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With commerce closely tied to international wealth and prestige, it played a
central role in conflicts between Britain and her continental rivals, particularly France.
Mercantilist economic theory dominated the landscape during the eighteenth century. In a
mercantilist system, wealth acquisition and trade were zero-sum games; as one party
gained wealth, another lost it.23 It was crucial, then, for Britain to expand her overseas
commercial networks to not only line the pockets of its ruling classes but to take that
opportunity away from their French rivals. The profits generated from commerce could
be also funneled towards the navy to cover the costs of fighting against the French;
indeed, trade was “essential to the ‘sinews of war.’”24 It was the foundation upon which
Britain’s war-making ability was placed. Trade was, simply put, “the most reliable means
of creating national wealth.”25 There was a symbiotic relationship between commerce and
the Navy, another source of national power. The Navy would protect transatlantic trade,
which would increase profits back in London. Those profits then could be put towards the
maintenance and expansion of the Navy, which could project power against Britain’s
continental rivals.26 In the great game of international rivalry of the eighteenth century,
everything tied back to commercial success.
Commerce unified the disparate parts of the empire, reinforced the ruling power
of the propertied classes, and helped finance wars against France. But it served one more
critical role in the ideological construction of the British Empire; it was the bridge that
brought together empire and liberty. Intellectuals like Niccolo Machiavelli and John
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Milton struggled to see how an empire focused on territorial expansion and outward
projection of power could maintain its freedom; Armitage referred to this as “the
competing pressures of liberty at home and expansion abroad.”27 Some English thinkers
suggested that a maritime commercial empire not focused on universal territorial gains
could be a free empire—free, of course, only for white men of property. Britain looked to
the examples set by trading republics like Venice and the Netherlands. Armitage sums up
the British concepts of liberty, empire, and commerce with a syllogism: “If liberty were
the precondition for successful commerce, and commerce was the cause of greatness,
then liberty would be the guarantee of commercial grandezza.”28 Commerce was a means
to keep the empire free, allowing Britain to be a “civilizing influence” on the world in
contrast to the “oppressive empires” of their European rivals.29 In turn, the freedom
provided by commerce would bring about greater profits from trade. Commerce brought
unity; it cemented power; it elevated prestige abroad; and it was one of the very
foundations of British freedom, even if that freedom was restricted to elite white men.
To protect the all-important commercial networks, Britain relied on its navy,
which during the eighteenth century grew into an indomitable and unstoppable fighting
force. After the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the British Navy made a
priority of constructing dockyards at every corner of their empire. Gibraltar and Minorca
were prominent dockyards during the war, and in the 1720s installations were added in
the Caribbean at Jamaica and Antigua.30 The wars of the 1740s saw Britain repeatedly
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deal defeats to France and Spain at sea to further their naval dominance. After the Seven
Years’ War, Britain’s control of the seas was unmatched by any continental rival.31
The Navy, much like the commerce it was protecting, was seen as an instrument
of freedom to Britain. Intellectuals warned of the dangers of standing armies, using the
ancient example of the Roman Empire and the more contemporary example of the
Glorious Revolution to demonstrate the tyrannical potential of a full-time land force.32
Another oft-cited example of the horrors of a standing army came from the domain of
Louis XIV of France, a kingdom looked down upon as “unfree” by the British. Standing
navies, however, did not offer the same threat of tyranny. A strong transoceanic navy
would not only protect commerce—itself an important facet of the liberty of the British
Empire—but also nullify the need for a full standing army and thus protect the British
homeland from suffering under potentially restrictive military repression.
Boasting the strongest navy in the world gave Britain an immense sense of
national pride verging on arrogance. Edward Grey’s famous line that “the British Army
should be a projectile to be fired by the British Navy,” though stated many years after the
Revolution, accurately describes British attitudes toward maritime dominance in the
eighteenth century. As one source claimed, Britain’s “Trade, Commerce, and Publick
Wealth are chiefly owing to our NAVY.”33 Pride in the Navy existed at all levels of
society; the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-48) was waged primarily to appease public outcry
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for naval war against Spain. James Thomson’s famous poem, written during that conflict,
encapsulates the heroic sentiments directed towards the Navy:
When Britain first, at heaven’s command,
Arose from out the azure main,
This was the charter of the land,
And guardian angels sung this strain –
‘Rule, Britannia, rule the waves;
Britons never will be slaves.’34
Montesquieu may have summarized British attitudes perfectly when he stated in the early
eighteenth century that “A naval empire has always given the peoples who have
possessed it a natural pride, because, feeling themselves able to insult others everywhere,
they believe that their power is as boundless as the ocean.”35 The successes of the Navy
gave the British people a sense that the world – or at the least, the world’s oceans – was
theirs to control.
Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free: that was the contemporary conception
of the British Empire. Their secure position on the British Isles and the strength of their
navy protected them from European attacks. Britain invested in that navy to expand
outward, establishing colonies in America and trading posts all over the globe. The
protection of the Navy allowed Britain to forge a commercial network that united British
identity, funded international rivalries, and preserved the freedom of the British people.
The successes of that commercial network and the victories of the Navy made Britain a
powerful country. The fact that did not go unnoticed by the British people, who boasted
of their achievements and increasingly saw themselves as entitled to greatness after the
Seven Years’ War. However, the addition of new territory after that conflict brought
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insecurity over the ideological construction of their empire, an insecurity that grew to
exasperation over reports of unrest in the American colonies. The coming Revolutionary
War would strike further blows at the ideological framework of the British Empire; many
of these blows came from American privateers.
Logistics, Commerce, and Pride: Privateer Attacks in the Revolution
The American Revolution itself was a direct attack against the integrity of the
British Empire; trade with the American colonies made up a large portion of the British
economy, and Britain had just fought a war with France to protect those holdings. The
British public detested the rebellious Americans for their insolence, but reserved some of
their most vehement attacks for American privateers. The logistical and commercial
maritime networks protected by the Royal Navy were crucial to Britain’s identity as a
free and prosperous empire; it was these networks that privateers attacked. American
privateers devastated British commerce, driving up insurance rates and severely
restricting the British accumulation of wealth. They decimated the crucial logistical
networks across the Atlantic, seizing ships carrying munitions for the army and food for
colonists still loyal to the Crown. Privateers also dented the pride of the Royal Navy, who
were unable to prevent American attacks on trade or even on the coast of Britain proper,
and in doing so dented the pride of the British nation. If British pride and identity could
be so easily attacked by a band of quasi-legal rebel plunderers, what did that mean for
Britain’s standing as a glorious nation?
Attacks on Commerce and Logistics
British expansion across the Atlantic world was built on the backs of its maritime
networks, as discussed in the previous section. Those maritime networks provided a boon
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to commerce and trade for British merchants and logistical support for colonists overseas.
Commerce and logistics, in turn, brought liberty and unity to the British Empire.
However, commercial and logistical networks across the Atlantic only functioned
effectively when the Atlantic was safe and secure. During the Revolution, American
privateers made the Atlantic a dangerous place for British merchant and supply vessels,
decimating the existing maritime networks and disrupting the liberty and unity they
provided the British Empire.
The attacks of American privateers had a significant impact on British commerce
during the Revolutionary War. American privateers swarmed British shipping the world
over, seizing prizes off the American coast, in the Caribbean, and even in European
waters. The number of ships captured is a testament to the impact of American
privateering. One captain, Gustavus Conyngham, captured thirty-one ships alone.36
Benjamin Franklin’s small fleet of privateers tallied 114 British ships captured or
destroyed during the war.37 More important than the total number of ship captures is the
value of those prizes; as privateers primarily targeted commercial vessels, the loss of
profits for British merchants was profound. In the West Indies alone, privateers seized
assets worth over 2 million pounds sterling – and that figure only covers through the year
1777.38 One author suggests that over the course of the war, privateer attacks resulted in
twenty-seven million dollars of damage to British commerce.39 In an attempt to avoid
losing cargo to the privateers, British merchants occasionally used extreme tactics:
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The Thames also presented the unusual and melancholy spectacle of
numbers of foreign ships, particularly French, taking in cargoes of English
commodities for various ports of Europe, the property of our own
merchants, who were thus seduced to seek that protection under the
colours of other nations, which the British flag used to afford to all the
world.40
The evidence of privateering’s impact on the British economy is so prevalent throughout
primary and secondary source literature that in a recent publication Robert Patton was
able to claim that privateering’s “impact on the British economy wasn’t in question.”41
Along with the loss of property for British merchants came a sharp rise in
insurance costs. Merchants could insure their cargoes through organizations like Lloyd’s
of London to protect themselves from losses if the cargo should be captured or lost at sea.
With so many ships being seized by American privateers during the war, insurers
demanded astronomically high insurance rates. A press report from 1777 stated that
“Insurance on Ships from Jamaica for London was done at 20 l. [percent] and from the
Leeward Islands at 15 per Cent.”42 For comparison, insurance rates during the Seven
Years War only rose to six percent in times of great crisis.43 Insurance even spiked to
unheard-of rates on such short voyages as the route from London to Holland.44 The rise in
insurance rates was a force multiplier; even if merchants’ property arrived at its
destination safely, the inordinately high rates for insurance drastically cut commercial
profits during the war.
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While Britain’s oceanic networks brought profit for merchants, they also brought
supplies to colonists living on the fringes of the Empire. Privateer attacks disrupted the
logistical supplies lines of the British Empire during the war, disrupting the unity
provided by those maritime networks. Nowhere were privateering attacks on logistics felt
more than in the British West Indies. Their archipelagic nature meant the networks
running to these colonies were vulnerable to attack by commerce-raiding ships. American
entrepreneur William Bingham made the most of that susceptibility. Upon arriving in the
French port of Martinique in 1776 Bingham immediately set to work commissioning
privateers to attack British trade. News of Bingham’s activities quickly reached Europe.
Letters from St. Christopher characterized Bingham as the man “who commissions all the
French pirates.”45 King George was even informed of the privateer activity in the
Caribbean.46 Bingham’s entrepreneurial activity flooded the waters of the Caribbean with
American privateers; in an attempt to salvage some profit from the quagmire, British
merchants began sending their goods on French vessels; some even made their own side
deals with Bingham.47
While Bingham’s privateers made him a rich man, and cut into British profits
from the West Indies, their attacks had a far greater impact on logistics in the region.
Planters in the Caribbean devoted almost all their arable land to the cultivation of cash
crops like sugar and tobacco, leaving little space to grow foodstuffs. As a result, the
Caribbean colonies were reliant on food supply from overseas. The attacks of American
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privateers jeopardized the supply of food for the British West Indies, resulting in
devastating conditions for the planters there. One commentator from Grenada wrote a
letter in 1777 that was published widely on both sides of the Atlantic:
Every thing continues excessive dear here…A fleet of vessels came from
Ireland a few days ago; from sixty vessels that departed from Ireland not
above twenty-five arrived in this and the neighboring islands; the others
(as it is thought) being all taken by the American privateers. God knows, if
this American war continues much longer, we shall all die with hunger.48
The swarms of privateers in the West Indies had reduced the region’s output to a trickle,
and had wrecked British logistical networks in the area. As Admiral George Rodney
stated in 1780, the attacks in the Caribbean have “done England more harm than all the
arms of her most potent enemies.”49
The maritime networks of the British Empire were supposed to facilitate the safe
flow of goods and supplies between the colonies and the homeland, ensuring the
guarantees of liberty and unity provided by commercial and logistical activity. American
privateers disrupted those networks during the Revolution by cutting into the commercial
profits of British merchants—both through seizures at sea and by forcing insurers to drive
up their prices—and by seizing supplies bound for colonists precariously close to
starvation. Their attacks on commercial and logistical maritime networks represented to
the British a direct attack on the Empire’s ideological foundations. If the networks were
in danger, the liberty and unity of the Empire was in danger. For protection the British
turned to their vaunted Royal Navy—but they were to be disappointed.
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Attacks on the Pride of the Navy
The British were a maritime people, increasingly reliant on their navy for
protection, security, and projection of power. Throughout the eighteenth century the
Royal Navy had won victory after victory, acquiring a prideful attitude perilously close to
overconfidence. Parliament trusted the Royal Navy with an immense slate of duties in the
Revolution. They were tasked with protecting the homeland from attack, guarding the
transatlantic networks from commerce-raiders, providing combat support to the British
Army in America, and engaging the French Navy after they joined the conflict in 1778.
The tenacity of American privateer attacks proved too much. In the Revolutionary War
the Royal Navy failed to live up to its lofty reputation in the eyes of the British public,
who sharply criticized the Navy for its failures to protect British commerce and logistics
from the depredations of American privateers.
The British mercantile class was especially critical of the Royal Navy. Merchants
were afraid to send their ships for fear of privateers. A 1776 letter to the Public
Advertiser, a strongly anti-government publication, warned of a privateer prowling the
waters around Plymouth, and beseeched the publication to “make it public at Lloyd’s” to
warn merchants of the danger.50 The same year the Public Advertiser reported on a fleet
of merchant ships holed up in Barbados, fearful to sail without any escort “on account of
the Multiplicity of American Privateers.”51 As privateer attacks began to cut into profits,
merchants demanded convoys to protect their ships and hopefully put a damper on
skyrocketing insurance rates. The Navy attempted to alleviate the crisis by providing
convoys to merchant fleets, but even these were no guarantee of protection. On long
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Atlantic crossings, ships could get separated from their escort and subsequently picked
off by lurking American privateers. In one instance a convoyed merchant fleet sailing
from Jamaica to England only arrived with 23 of the original 118 ships of the fleet.52 The
Royal Navy did attempt to alleviate the pressures it faced during the war; however, in the
public eye they more often came out the scapegoat than the hero.
The press was merciless to British admirals who proved ineffective in their
positions. Admiral Samuel Graves was one such officer. Responsible for the Navy’s
forces outside of Boston, Graves was in command during the outbreak of the conflict and
subsequent Siege of Boston. The ships at his disposal were in a state of disrepair, but
Graves himself was not a particularly competent officer; one British official referred to
him as “a corrupt Admiral without any shadow of capacity.”53 As the siege continued
American ships – including those under George Washington – proved more audacious in
their attacks on British supply ships, yet Graves remained apathetic and unable to stop the
tide. For his troubles the British press lambasted him in sarcastic fashion:
This vigilant officer [Graves], instead of sending his squadron to protect
the store-ships and transports from England, had, with the utmost
prudence, ordered the ships of war in this harbor to be secured with bombs
[booms] all round, to prevent their being boarded and taken by the Rebel
whale-boats…no doubt the Parliament will thank him on his glorious
return for so effectually preserving his Majesty’s ships.54
Yet the most virulent responses towards privateering and the Navy’s failure to
respond came from incidents in home waters. As discussed in the introduction to this
chapter, Gustavus Conyngham’s seizure of the Harwich packet sparked a large degree of
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concern in Britain. While many of the papers committed to fearmongering, the Public
Advertiser placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Admiralty:
The Capture of the Orange Packet is a complete Refutation of what we
have been so often told concerning the reduced State of the Americans.
They have hitherto kept us in sufficient Play on their own Coasts, and
now, in their Turn they even venture to assail ours. Old Twitcher [Lord
Sandwich, head of the Admiralty] may blush for once at having suffered
such an Insult so near our very Doors, after such repeated but impudent
Boasts about the Number and Readiness of his Ships. But his Fleets seems
to be literally Fleets of Observation only.55
The Royal Navy’s job, first and foremost, was the protection of the British Isles. After the
seizure of the Harwich Packet, there was some concern as to whether that mission was
actually being fulfilled.
In 1779, Benjamin Franklin wrote, “We continue to insult the Coasts of these
Lords of the Ocean with our little Cruisers.”56 Privateers did not directly confront the
Navy; however, by effectively raiding British commerce, they damaged the pride and
invincibility of the Royal Navy. For Britain, the Royal Navy was more than a military
institution; it was a symbol of national pride, a bulwark of freedom and empire. American
privateers circumvented the power of the Royal Navy to launch devastating attacks on the
British Empire’s maritime commercial and logistical networks. In doing so, they struck
directly at the heart of Britain’s imperial ideology. For British observers during the War
for Independence privateer attacks were a nuisance to profit-making but, more than that,
they represented a challenge to the very identity of the British Empire.
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Ideology and Identity: The American Perspective
The British Empire, to use Armitage’s phrase, was seen by both British and
American observers as “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free.” Their maritime
commercial and logistical networks, and the protection the Royal Navy provided to those
networks, ensured the freedom, prosperity, and prestige of the British Empire. American
privateers attacked those networks during the Revolutionary War, cutting into British
profits and leading British observers to question the very identity of their empire. The
British response to American privateering was so outspoken because they viewed
privateer attacks in the context of the ideological construction of their empire. But did
American privateers view their own actions in the same way? Were American privateers
motivated by a desire to rid themselves of the transatlantic networks of which they had
for so long been a part? Not exactly. Americans enjoyed the benefits of the transatlantic
system; increasingly after the French and Indian War, though, Americans felt that system
and the ideological construction of the British Empire did not guarantee them the
freedom it was supposed to. Privateer attacks were not motivated by any antagonism
towards the existence of British maritime networks; rather, they were fighting to improve
their place within that network, to guarantee themselves the benefits of freedom they felt
were lacking in their current situation.
The so-called “Pamphlet Debate,” the multitude of essays and opinions on
relations between the colonies and Britain following the Seven Years’ War, offers insight
into the primary grievances of the American people leading up to the Revolution. Notably
lacking are complaints against Britain’s strong maritime networks; rather, American
authors primarily railed against the Stamp Act and the perceived unjust British imposition
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of power upon the colonists. Authors particularly framed their grievances with the British
in terms of property. James Otis proclaimed, “Now can there be any liberty, where
property is taken away without consent?”57 The consent to which Otis refers is
representation in Parliament, another common theme from the pamphlets. Stephen
Hopkins was more forceful in his writings, stating that “Those who are governed at the
will of another, or of others, and whose property may be taken from them by taxes, or
otherwise, without their own consent, and against their will, are in the miserable
condition of slaves.”58 The main grievance the Americans had was the nature of
Parliament’s taxation of the colonies without colonial representation in Parliament. Such
a scenario, Otis suggested, would breakdown the “barrier of liberty.”59
Neither party wanted out of the British-American commercial network. Indeed,
American commerce accounted for almost half of all British shipping, and regulations
mandated that the vast majority of America’s trade went to Britain or other British
colonies.60 In his deposition to Parliament, Benjamin Franklin addressed the colonists’
grievances regarding British regulation of the Empire’s commerce. He spoke of a
difference between internal and external taxation, suggesting that Parliament had every
right to lay external taxes, but none to lay internal duties. External duties were not placed
on necessities; as Franklin stated, “If people do not like it at that price, they refuse it; they
are not obliged to pay it.” Internal taxes, however, were “forced from the people without
their consent,” and would by their very nature extort money from the people who offered
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no representation towards such a tax. He stressed repeatedly in his deposition that he had
“never heard any objection to the right of laying duties to regulate commerce,” but also
stated that “a right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to be in parliament, as we are
not represented there.”61 Benjamin Franklin’s deposition demonstrates that American
protests were not related to Britain’s commercial network, but rather their impositions
upon the Americans’ participation in that network and their own personal, internal affairs.
The actions and motivations of the privateer sailors discussed in Chapter Two
demonstrate that, in addition to profit motives, privateers were driven by a notion of
resistance to British rule. They resented British involvement in their mercantile maritime
activities, perceiving such action to be a violation of their economic and social liberties.
They benefited from British maritime networks, just not British authority over those
networks. Once the war concluded and America had its independence, many former
privateersmen found work on merchant vessels following the conclusion of hostilities.
Andrew Sherburne sailed for nearly another five years after the war on various merchant
cruises between America, the West Indies, and Britain, utilizing similar networks to those
in place before the war.62 Gideon Olmsted too continued to captain merchant cruises with
Britain following the cessation of hostilities.63 Privateer sailors did not want to push back
against maritime commerce—it was their livelihood. Rather, they wanted the freedom to
pursue that commerce the way they saw fit, outside of the models of a British Empire that
had never quite offered the freedom to sailors it promised.
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The privateer investors and elites who so ardently supported the American cause
also saw no need to do away with the existing maritime networks. Those who strove to
create a classical republic based on devotion to the public interest in America were
especially critical of Britain for its lack of virtue, but many of their complaints related to
the perceived corruption of the British army and not the existence of maritime networks
connecting Britain to America.64 Many of the most avid privateer investors were
merchants, who expressly benefited from close commercial connections to British
merchants. Robert Morris originally could not bring himself to invest in privateers for he
“had extensive Connections & dealings with many Worthy Men in England” and did not
want to steal from his former associates.65 The merchants’ livelihoods depended on the
maritime commercial networks that were part of the British Empire; they saw no need to
eradicate those connections. Rather, privateer investors wanted the freedom to do as they
wished within a transatlantic system, supporting the American cause while maintaining
their mercantile connections.
Perhaps the most definitive piece of evidence that Americans were not rebelling
against the existence of transatlantic commercial networks is the continuation—and even
the increase—of trade between the former colonies and Britain following the
Revolutionary War. Emily Buchnea analyzes the expansion of the New York-Liverpool
network during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Before the Revolution New York
and Liverpool were relatively minor ports for transatlantic trade, but they grew in
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importance during the war.66 After the war, trade between the two ports “not only
recovered but thrived.”67 She goes on to suggest that some of that growth was due to
“greater confidence in the US new economic independence” on the part of merchants and
businessmen.68 While the Liverpool-New York trade described by Buchnea is but one
example, on the whole trade between the new United States and Britain continued and
indeed expanded following the American War of Independence.
American privateer attacks did strike at the ideological foundations of the British
Empire, but the evidence does not suggest that the Americans were motivated by a desire
to do away with those foundations. Much of the discourse leading up to the war related to
the argument of “taxation without representation.” Americans wanted to be a part of the
empire and reap the benefits of a transoceanic trade network protected by the Royal
Navy, but they questioned whether such a construction of empire granted them the
freedom they felt was rightfully theirs. After the war Anglo-American trade continued in
earnest, with former privateersmen finding work aboard merchant ships and former
privateer investors returning to their peacetime businesses of transatlantic trade, partaking
in trading networks now as independent Americans rather than subjects of the British
Empire. Americans enjoyed the benefits of a commercial and maritime position; with
independence, they hoped to reap the benefits of those networks along with the freedom
won in the Revolutionary War.
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Conclusion
After the war, London’s Livery trading guilds proclaimed to King George III,
“Your armies are captured, the wonted superiority of your navies is annihilated; your
dominions are lost.”69 The empire that the British had come to see as “Protestant,
commercial, maritime, and free” had taken a number of blows during the war, not the
least from American privateers. Privateers had weakened Britain’s maritime shipping
lanes, threatening British logistics and commerce, and were undeterred by the ineffective
actions of the Royal Navy. As a result, American privateers threatened the construction
and identity of the British Empire itself. Americans involved in privateering, though,
were not against every component of the British Empire; indeed, they benefited greatly
from the transatlantic commercial and logistical networks. Their actions were driven by a
desire to regain the freedom that they no longer felt was theirs within the British Empire.
The actions of privateers during the Revolutionary War cannot be solely
explained through the lens of the profit motive. That narrative deigns commerce merely
the practice of making money through trade. British observers, though, clearly thought of
commerce as a component of their free and prestigious empire. Privateers who attacked
commerce did so with the understanding that commerce was indelibly tied to ideological
debates regarding freedom and liberty. Their desires for independence, profit, and a better
place within the transatlantic trading system are inseparable from the ideological
construction of the British Empire and cannot solely be explained by the motivations of
profit and plunder.
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CONCLUSION

Privateering was no flash in the pan in American history. Though it may be a
forgotten part of the Revolution today, at the time it was important enough to the
Founding Fathers to enshrine privateering in the Constitution of the United States. Article
I Section 8 of the document grants Congress the power “To declare War [and] Grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”1 By including the authority to authorize privateers in the
founding documents of the nation, the Revolutionary generation ensured that privateering
would remain a part of America’s approach to war. And remain it did; when America
went to war with Britain again in 1812, Congress was quick to outfit privateers. Some of
the same themes discussed in this thesis emerged in that war. Members of the United
States Navy frequently complained that privateers confounded the Navy in recruiting and
outfitting vessels. Privateering was then a component of American maritime culture
during wartime in the early years of the Republic. Even when European nations outlawed
privateering with the Declaration of Paris in 1856, America refused to sign; they wanted
to preserve their right to commission privateers.2
All of that future privateer activity built off of the actions of privateers during
America’s founding war, the War for Independence. During that war privateers were
front and center. Major figures on the American side got involved in privateer ventures,
thousands of men signed up to go sailing, and privateers preyed on British commerce in

“The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription,” National Archives and Records Administration.
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript.
2
For more on the diplomatic interplay surrounding the Declaration of Paris, see Jan Martin Lemnitzer,
Power, Law and the End of Privateering (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
1
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American, Caribbean, and European waters. But scholars have largely ignored
privateering during that conflict. There is a great debate among scholars on the strategic
effectiveness of the privateers in the war and an analysis of their place in the military
context of the Revolution; there is however little attempt to push privateering any further
than the fields of strategy. Historians write off privateering as driven by the desire for
profit and the occasional desire to fight back against the British. Such a self-interested
activity does not fit the narrative of the “virtuous” Revolution that has become the
mythos of America’s founding.
With this thesis I have attempted to complicate the profit-narrative of privateering
by connecting it to the wider world of the Revolutionary Period. From its origins
privateering was not a mere profit-driven plunder spree, but rather an integral part of the
expanding state system in the Atlantic world. Privateering took on different meanings for
the sailors and the investors. For the men actually on board the ships, it provided both a
chance to make a profit and an ideal course with which to resist British authority at sea.
For investors, privateering was a way to make a profit during war, but that profit-making
had to contend with the prevailing attitudes lauding classical republicanism and
disinterestedness among American patriots. On a broader scale, privateers attacked the
commercial maritime foundations of the British Empire, helping to push the American
colonists away from a British conception of their identity and towards a new American
notion of self.
My approach to privateering in this project has been one of breadth. I have
connected privateering with a number of different debates contemporary to the
Revolution, including debates on commerce, republicanism, identity, and interest. Further
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research could look into privateering’s place in these debates in more depth. For example,
one could investigate in more detail how privateering affected broader economic market
trends in maritime commerce before, during, and after the Revolutionary War. Another
course of study would be to apply my methodology to privateering in the War of 1812 to
understand how privateering fit into the ideological frameworks surrounding the
American nation during that conflict. I have shown that privateering as a phenomenon
was intricately linked with a variety of groups and facets of Revolutionary-era society;
analyzing each of those relationships in turn could provide a more complete
understanding of privateering and its place in the American Revolution.
Motivation is a tricky thing to analyze historically. While one individual may take
up arms for the good of their country, another may do so for the good of their wallet.
Motivations are rarely so one-sided or detectable. The only advantage historians have is
that motivations are not developed in isolation; they are created in reaction to the world
around an individual. That world, and the ideologies, attitudes, and frames of mind within
it, drove the motivations for privateering during the American Revolution. It was
profitable, yes—but it was also caught up in the spirit of independence, republicanism,
and identity. The action ran both ways; privateering both influenced and was influenced
by the Revolution. As the practice was intricately linked with so many facets of society,
the ripple effects of those influences were felt across the spectrum of the American
Revolutionary Period.
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APPENDIX
Orders for a Letter of Marque1
Capt Silvanus Jenkes

Providence Decemr 15th 1779

Sir,
You being Commandr of my Sloop Revenge now fiting for the Sea, my
Orders are that you proceed to Ocoys [Cayes] on the South Side of Hispaniola, after
Chasing any Vessels you may think best on your passage, and there dispose of the Cargoe
for the most you can takeing especial care to ask a good high price for Every Article, as
you know the difficulty of getting a Cargoe here is very great and Expensive, as you are a
Letter of Mark I hope youl take a good prize going which if should be the Case, youl
send her to me under the Command of your mate, Unless she should be loaded with Silk
or Lumber, in which Case you will take her with you, & sell the Cargoe at Ocoys
[Cayes], & bring her home with you Loaded with Good Sugar, Rum, Coffee &c. In this
Case I hope you will be able to get some more hands for the Revenge there, so that you
may be able to make another prize on your passage back, which youl bring with you to
me. Youl bring home in the Revenge, a Full Load good Sugar Inclosed by some Rum,
Powder, Coffee & Brandy if to be had cheap or any other Article you may see which will
answer better if you can get some good Duck their at a moderate price I recommend your
getting such new Souls as the Sloop may want, if you should be so Lucky as to arrive to a
good market, so that youl have more than you can Bring on good Sugar, Rum, Powder
Coffee & Brandy, youl in this case bring some Cambricks [cambric, a fine fabric]

1

John Brown to Silvanus Jenckes, December 15 1779, in the John Brown (1736-1803) Papers, Folder 2,
Box 1, MSS 312, Rhode Island History Society, Providence, RI.
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together with some good Skirting & other [items] or whatever you think will nett more
proffitt. Your Commission is 5% on Sales & 2% on Returns in goods but nothing on your
Disbursements, & if you pay any Commissions to a French Man its to be out of the 2d
5&2%. I had Rather you should Draw no Commission their In which Case 7% of all the
goods you bring home for the Cargoe will be yours on your Return and your priviledge is
also to be 7% in all you bring in the Sloop Exclusive of what belongs to your Mate &
people, who you are to see has not more goods on board than is allowed them by your
Portledge Bill. If any thing happens to you which Renders you Unable to do the business
of the Voyage, your Mate Mr. Warner is to Observe these Orders, and act in your place
on in his absence your 2d mate Mr. Hopkins. I hope to see you back to my Wharf by the
20th of March with a Rich Cargo and a good prize--- And,
Am Sir your friend & Owner—
John Brown
…
by the above Prices you must Calculate which Articles will Answer best to bring,
Allways makeing due Allowance for the Bulk & weight of Each Article on acct of the
Freight. If you should find that Good molasses may be had Easey & Very Cheape, and on
the other hand sugars should be scars [scarce] and high you may in this Case bring me 10,
12, or 15 [units] Molasses but if Sugar & Coffee should be Cheape, I chose you should
bring me no Molasses—
I am &c John Brown
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description of privateering in general during this time, with some notable
comparisons to my own period of study. He also discusses the importance of
narratives written about these privateering voyages and how they influenced
British popular fiction like Robinson Crusoe. I will be using Beattie's work in my
first chapter tracing the practice of privateering and its differences from piracy.
Belich, James. Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Angloworld, 1783-1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
James Belich analyzes the power of the Anglo-settler world of the nineteenth
century in this book, highlighting the immense growth of cities in the frontiers of
the United States and Australia. He particularly tries to compare aspects of the
two experiences to draw conclusions about Anglocentrism in the 1800s. I have
specifically used Belich's work for his brief discussion on gold rushes in Chapter
Nine, providing a useful theoretical framework to explain the causes of gold
rushes. I then take this framework and apply it to privateering in the 1770s and
1780s.
Black, Jeremy. The British Seaborne Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Jeremy Black's massive work investigates the naval components of the British
Empire from its early days in the seventeenth century to very near the present day.
He connects Britain's maritime dominance with its empire, showing how each
built off of the other. Throughout the book he also connects Britain's maritime
relationship with America, from their split in the Revolution to their close
partnership in the twentieth century. I have particularly used Black's work to
investigate the rise of the British Navy through its expansion of empire, a
discussion that takes place in my fourth chapter.
Bourne, Russell. Cradle of Violence: How Boston's Waterfront Mobs Ignited the
American Revolution. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2006.
Russell Bourne looks at the role that sailors played in anti-British demonstrations
in Boston over the course of the eighteenth century, culminating in the
Revolutionary War. His scholarship correlates with that of Gilje and Rediker,
emphasizing the role that sailors and "rabble" played, and working to return them
to a position of prominence in Revolutionary histories. His narrative specifically
focuses on the port of Boston, a hub of sailor demonstrations before the war.
Bourne's work includes a lengthy description of the Knowles' Affair, which I have
drawn on for my discussion of that incident in Chapter One.
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Bowen-Hassell, E. Gordon, Dennis M. Conrad, and Mark L. Hayes. Sea Raiders of the
American Revolution: The Continental Navy in European Waters. Washington,
D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2003.
This publication of the Naval Historical Foundation focuses on three separate
captains of the Continental Navy during the Revolution: Lambert Wickes,
Gustavus Conyngham, and John Paul Jones. All three sailors primarily cruised off
the coast of Great Britain during the war. The authors argue for the impact that the
vessels of the Continental Navy sailing in Europe had on Britain during the war,
building off of mainly primary source evidence related to the three captains. The
authors demonstrate the diplomatic, economic, and psychological effects that the
captains had. In my discussions of these three captains, particularly Conyngham, I
have relied upon this secondary source.
Brandes, Stuart D. Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1997.
University of Wisconsin history professor Stuart Brandes provides a thorough
history of American warfare in his work Warhogs. However, he eschews military
and politically strategy to analyze the economic and moral questions surrounding
war profiteering and speculation in wartime. Brandes uses a wide range of
primary and secondary sources to investigate the full gamut of American history
from colonial years to modern day. His argument is primarily an economic one, as
he suggests that money and financial gain can be seen as a chief cause for
America’s wars, including the Revolution. During the Revolution, he suggests
that men fought at the beginning of the war out of fervor for the cause, but as the
war went on increasingly needed economic benefits from war. I have mainly used
his first and second chapters analyzing the early colonial years and the
Revolutionary War to analyze the ideas of virtue and morality present in that war,
and how they compared to notions of privateering.
Bromley, J.S. "Outlaws at Sea, 1660-1720: Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity among the
Caribbean Freebooters." In Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, edited by C. R.
Pennell, 169-94. New York: New York University Press, 2001.
J.S. Bromley's chapter analyzes piracy socially, looking at how pirates developed
egalitarian communities in the Caribbean. He discusses the interplay between
plunder, privateering, and various forms of piracy from freebooting to
buccaneering. His primary argument relates to the fraternity expressed among
pirate communities, a unique trait that Bromley believes emerged from class
consciousness on shipboard during Atlantic expansion. Bromley's chapter helps
me analyze the place of piracy in the early modern Atlantic, and how it was both
similar and dissimilar to privateering.
Buchnea, Emily. "Transatlantic Transformations: Visualizing Change Over Time in the
Liverpool-New York Trade Network, 1763-1833." Enterprise and Society 15, no.
4 (2014): 687-721.
This journal article provides an analysis of the changing nature of AngloAmerican trading networks during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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Buchnea particularly uses visual representations to convey the enormity of the
trading volume between Liverpool and New York. She then delves into possible
explanations for those changes like wars, changing goods, and natural turnover in
the mercantile marketplace. One of my primary arguments to show that
Americans did not want a complete break from the empire's mercantile networks
is demonstrated in this article; trade actually increased considerably following the
conclusion of the war.
Casey, Michael Scott. Rebel Privateers: The Winners of American Independence.
Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.
In his thesis Michael Scott Casey investigates the effectiveness of American
privateers during the Revolution, and argues comprehensively that they were far
more effective in the war against the British than their Continental Navy
counterparts. His work uses quantifiable data to support his findings, particularly
building off of total commercial tonnage records from Lloyd's of London. Casey's
work takes the side of the privateers in the seemingly never-ending battle between
scholars over the relative effectiveness of the Navy and the privateers. Casey's
work is primarily useful for me in its strong use of quantifiable data which I will
rely on to show the economic impact of privateering in Chapter Four.
Clark, William Bell. Ben Franklin's Privateers; a Naval Epic of the American
Revolution. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956.
William Bell Clark's focus in this work is the privateers commissioned by
Benjamin Franklin to capture prisoners from the British to exchange for the
Americans held in Mill and Forton prisons. Clark argues that though the
privateers under Franklin failed to capture many prisoners to exchange, they did
succeed in terrorizing the British coasts and wreaking havoc on offshore
commercial assets. Clark's work is one of the cornerstone sources investigating
American privateers sailing in European waters during the war, and is thus my
main source for information on the privateers sailing under Franklin’s authority.
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992.
Linda Colley's book is a cornerstone in the literature on British nationalism and
the development of British identity in the eighteenth century. Colley shows that
Britain was forged in relation to France, the "other," identifying itself as a
Protestant nation. The nation used its overseas colonies to create a rich
commercial transatlantic network; as such, people wanted to be a part of the
British Empire. The failure to understand exactly how that empire changed
following the new acquisitions in the Seven Years' War led directly to the
breakaway of the American colonies, Colley argues. Colley's work provides key
arguments and ideas to support my discussion of the ideological foundations of
the British Empire in chapter four, particularly its commercial and maritime
components.
Crawford, Michael J. "The Privateering Debate in Revolutionary America." The Northern
Mariner 21 (2011): 1035-051.
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Michael Crawford synthesizes many of the arguments related to privateering's
contribution to the American war effort. He also investigates the opinions of
historical actors on privateering to build a portrait of how Americans perceived
the practice during the war. The first part of his article serves as a literature
review of the relevant secondary source material on privateering; the second half
is compiled primarily of primary sources from NDAR. This journal article is
particularly useful for me for its synthesis of a number of helpful secondary
sources, and covers much of the same ground that I do in my third chapter;
however, I add a component of republican ideology that Crawford neglects.
Dull, Jonathan R. The Age of the Ship of the Line: The British & French Navies, 16501815. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.
Jonathan Dull provides a comparative history with his analysis of the British and
French navies during the eighteenth century. The two powers were in constant
rivalry during that time period, and Dull makes a convincing case that changes to
one navy had clear impacts on the other. He demonstrates that the British Navy
consistently got the better of their French opponents, but was never able to fully
neutralize the power of the French until the victory at Trafalgar. I have used Dull's
work particularly for its description of the expansion of British naval presence
during the early part of the eighteenth century, a move that correlated with the
expansion of their empire.
Gilje, Paul A. Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of
Revolution. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
Paul Gilje, Professor of History at the University of Oklahoma, is one of the
foremost scholars of maritime culture in the Age of Revolution. In this book, he
looks at sailors' concepts of "liberty" in the context of the American Revolution.
He goes against Rediker and other Marxist historians, positing that sailors were
not rioting and acting out of class interests. In his analysis of primary source
memoirs and journals, he sees more activity related to personal liberty and "living
for the moment." His attempt to paint a picture of maritime life at the time is
effective. Though I do not agree fully with every component of his work, Gilje's
writings help me to support my arguments about sailors' resistance before and
during the war, and offers a wide breadth of primary sources that I can potentially
draw upon for further research.
Gilje, Paul A. "Loyalty and Liberty: The Ambiguous Patriotism of Jack Tar in the
American Revolution." Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies
67, no. 2 (April 1, 2000): 165-93. Accessed October 16, 2016.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27774256.
Paul Gilje’s article examines the motivation of American seamen during the
Revolutionary War. He situates himself in opposition to Jesse Lemisch; he is not
convinced of a class consciousness or ideological drive among the seamen,
emphasizing more economic impetus. He is careful though to say that we cannot
apply a single motivation to an entire set of diverse historical actors. Gilje builds
his work off of primary source narratives of sailors and seamen from the
Revolutionary Period. Gilje’s article looks almost at the exact same historical
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question that I am investigating in my thesis. I will be expanding upon his work
by also looking at the role of sailors before the Revolution as a driving force
towards independence, and by investigating the interplay between the privateer
sailors (the focus of Gilje’s article) and privateer investors, looking at privateering
as a practice that took equally from “the above” and from “the below.”
Goldsmith, M. M. "Liberty, Virtue, and the Rule of Law, 1689-1770." In Republicanism,
Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, edited by David Wootton, 197-232.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
M.M Goldsmith's chapter directly confronts the issue of virtue in republican
thought. She argues that English republicans, influenced by Puritan thought,
connected with the virtue of disinterested as pivotal to a successful republic. In
doing so, virtue promoted civic liberty, which necessitated the involvement of all
citizens (at the time, all white men of property) in the political process. However,
not all republicans agreed with this concept of virtue; others like Mandeville and
Hume believed that self-interest could still exist within a virtuous republic. The
ideologies discussed by Goldsmith in this chapter provided an important
foundation and framework for my third chapter on privateering's place within
contemporary debates on republicanism in the American Revolution.
Hay, Douglas, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow.
Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England. New
York: Pantheon Books, 1975.
This compilation of essays investigates the relationship between the haves and the
have-nots in English society in the eighteenth century, with a particular focus on
the punishments meted out by the ruling classes on those beneath them. The
authors of this work use the "history from below" methodology, looking at how
criminals, peasants, and other members of lower societal rungs have shaped
history. Of particular use for my study are Chapters One ("Property, Authority,
and the Criminal Law" by Douglas Hay), Three ("Sussex Smugglers" by Cal
Winslow), and Four ("Wrecking and Coastal Plunder" by John G. Rule). These
chapters relate to the interplay between commercial property and criminal activity
along the coast, and as such offer similar phenomena to the practice of
privateering during the American Revolution later in the same century.
Hedges, James B. The Browns of Providence Plantation. Vol. 1: Colonial Years.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
Hedges' two-part biography serves as the primary family history of the Brown
family, offering insights into the various branches of the family. Much of the first
volume looks at the Brown brothers -- John, Nicholas, and Moses -- and their
actions during the years of the Revolutionary War. Moses was a noted
abolitionist, but John and Nicholas were avid investors in privateering. I have
used Hedges' biography primarily in my third chapter to augment the primary
sources of John Brown's correspondence I used to bolster my arguments on
privateer investors.
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Hill, Richard J. "Prizes." Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History. Edited by John B.
Hattendorf. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Accessed January 28, 2017.
https://goo.gl/n53uZE.
Hill's brief article takes a closer look at the functioning of prize courts and the
justification for prize jurisdiction. Prize courts were crucial to both privateering
and naval captures, serving as the governing bodies deciding on the legitimacy of
the capture. Hill's article is a useful summary of prize courts for it considers both
the practical components of the courts' operation as well as the legal justifications
for the courts, and augments my discussion of prize courts in Chapter One.
Lane, Kris E. Blood & Silver: A History of Piracy in the Caribbean and Central America.
Oxford: Signal, 1999.
This work offers a helpful overview of piracy in the early modern period,
beginning with the rise of Spain and corsairs on the Barbary Coast and continuing
to the early eighteenth century, when Britain fought a concerted campaign to
eliminate piracy from the Caribbean. Lane, a professor at Tulane University,
particularly looks to complicate the romanticized notion of piracy; he instead
considers the ways they related with the greater early modern Atlantic world
around them. The book proceeds in a more narrative format, jumping from pirate
story to pirate story. Lane's book provides a great starting point for my analysis of
piracy and its relationship with privateering and the early modern Atlantic.
Lemisch, Jesse. "Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of
Revolutionary America." The William and Mary Quarterly 25, no. 3 (July 1,
1968): 371-407. Accessed October 16, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1921773.
With this work Jesse Lemisch offers one of the first works of “history from
below” examining seamen during the years preceding the Revolution. It is a
comprehensive essay with immense use of footnotes that demonstrates the caged
life of a seaman – even comparing it to the enslavement of African Americans.
Lemisch builds off of that portrait to examine the seamen’s resistance to British
policies – particularly impressment – and argues that the riots and acts of
resistance were not disorganized responses, but rather politically-motivated
movements against British policies. Lemisch’s work is key for my analysis of the
role seamen played in the build-up to the American Revolution, as he touches on
nearly every major point in the discussion.
Lemnitzer, Jan Martin. Power, Law and the End of Privateering. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014.
Lemnitzer's book is an excellent analytical study of the legal dimensions of the
Declaration of Paris and the abolition of privateering in the mid-19th century.
Lemnitzer analyzes the complicated diplomatic interactions between Britain,
France, and the United States over the free ships-free goods policy so closely
intertwined with privateering. The fact that the US refused to sign the Declaration
is a testament to the acceptance of privateering among the elites of the US, despite
some qualms over its morality already present during the Revolution.
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Linebaugh, Peter, and Marcus Rediker. The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves,
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic. Boston:
Beacon Press, 2000. Accessed October 2, 2016. https://goo.gl/jQmP6j.
Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh look at the creation of what they call the
"hydrarchy," the section of society that resisted the rise of capitalism,
imperialism, and global commercial activity in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Rediker and Linebaugh approach their topic from below, looking more
at how members of the hydrarchy use their own agency rather than emphasizing
the actions of the ruling classes. Many of their sources, then, come from
criminals, pirates, and members of the "motley crew" of sailors and slaves.
Chapters Five (Hydrarchy: Sailors, Pirates, and the Maritime State) and Seven (A
Motley Crew in the American Revolution) are of particular interest to me in my
investigation of privateers. Though privateers were far from pirates, it is useful to
study that class of characters to see what influence pirates had on later privateers.
Their investigation on the role that sailors had in spurring forward the American
Revolution is particularly insightful for my arguments that privateering was not
strictly about financial gain.
Lunsford, Virginia West. Piracy and Privateering in the Golden Age Netherlands. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Accessed January 2, 2017.
https://goo.gl/3198HW.
This book analyzes the duality of Dutch privateers and freebooters during the
Golden Age of the United Provinces (around the 16th and 17th century). Lunsford
observes that while the Dutch had strict anti-piracy laws, particularly in an effort
to keep their multitude of privateers in check, they were often weakly enforced
when privateers would turn pirate, even against their own countrymen. She argues
that the reasons for the lax discipline can be explained by looking at privateering
from a cultural perspective; privateers in the Netherlands were heroes and
patriots, the successors of the Sea Beggars of the 16th century, and were integral
parts of the Netherlands economically and culturally. Her argument is similar to
mine in that she analyzes privateering from social perspectives and not strategic
ones, and supports my suggestion that privateering is a more complex
phenomenon than the phrase "legalized piracy" would suggest.
Maclay, Edgar Stanton. A History of American Privateers. New York: D. Appleton and
Co., 1899.
Published in 1899, Maclay's book serves as the first major study of American
privateers. Maclay contends that the American privateers deserve more credit for
the victory in the American Revolution than they were given in other histories,
notably those by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Maclay works off of a number of letters
and newspaper articles, but unfortunately does not provide citation information
for those sources. The first half of Maclay's work, surveying privateering before
and during the Revolutionary War, will be of the most use to me. Maclay’s work
is one of the first sources analyzing privateering, and as such plays an important
role in the discourse of the topic despite its somewhat-dated findings and style.
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Magra, Christopher P. "Anti-Impressment Riots and the Origins of the Age of
Revolution." International Review of Social History 58, no. S21 (2013): 131-51.
Accessed October 16, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/ejournals/article/312651041.
Magra’s article turns its focus on the practice of impressment, and the variety of
ways American sailors resisted the practice in the lead-up to the Revolutionary
War. He builds off of Linebaugh and Rediker’s work postulating that the
revolutionary actions of sailors helped push American elites closer to
independence. Magra cites numerous incidents of American resistance, including
the arrest of impressment gangs and the burning in effigy of British tenders.
Magra’s work adds to my investigation of sailor actions preceding the Revolution,
and helps support my argument that perhaps privateering and resistance to Britain
was about more than financial gains.
Magra, Christopher P. "The New England Cod Fishing Industry and Maritime
Dimensions of the American Revolution." Enterprise & Society 8, no. 4
(December 1, 2007): 799-806. Accessed October 16, 2016.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23700768.
This short article serves as a long-form abstract for Magra’s dissertation on the
New England cod industry and its role in the American Revolution. Magra
believes that the mobilization of such a large workforce of sailors and fishermen
had a major impact on the Revolution, but so few scholars have even broached
upon the industry in their analysis of the war. I can borrow from Magra’s critique
of most histories of the American Revolution as being “terra-centric,” as well as
building off of his arguments and including a brief discussion on the fishing
industry within the role that seamen played in the Revolution.
Magra, Christopher P. ""Soldiers... Bred to the Sea": Maritime Marblehead,
Massachusetts, and the Origins and Progress of the American Revolution." The
New England Quarterly 77, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 531-62. Accessed October
16, 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559726.
University of Tennessee Professor Christopher Magra focuses exclusively on the
activity of one seaport – Marblehead – in this investigation of sailors and the
American Revolution. He works to place the sailors and seamen of New England
coastal towns, and Marblehead in particular, back in the forefront of the
conversation on causes and motivations of the American Revolution. He connects
a number of strands together, including the resistance to impressment, the
rebellions against increased taxes, and the importance of the Fisheries Bill to the
merchants and sailors of Marblehead. I will be using Magra’s points on sailor
resistance to reinforce my stance that sailors played a role in pushing America
closer to Revolution.
Marshall, P. J. The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America,
C.1750-1783. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Marshall attempts to combine two strands of British imperial scholarship by
analyzing the "unmaking" of the British Empire in the Thirteen Colonies in
conjunction with the "making" of the British Empire in India and other overseas
territories. He discusses how Britain expanded organically in the 17th and 18th
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centuries, and the increase of British political authority that came with that
expansion. Most critically Britain's power that came from her overseas
possessions came from the many benefits of overseas commerce that her empire
provided. For Marshall it was the changes in political authority among the elites
that seemed to have the most effect on the "unmaking" of empire in America.
Marshall's work is useful for me in his discussion of the ideological and
perceptual foundations of the British Empire -- namely, trade.
Massey, Gregory D., and Jim Piecuch, eds. General Nathanael Greene and the American
Revolution in the South. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2012.
Massey and Piecuch have collected a series of essays focused on the character and
campaigns of Nathanael Greene during his time in the South. The essays cover a
range of topics related to Greene, from his relationship to partisan militias of the
South to his growing positive attitudes towards the American citizen-soldier. This
source is a strong supplement to any historian looking specifically at Greene's
campaigns during the later years of the war, though it focuses primarily on his
military accomplishments and less on his privateering business investments.
Nelson, James L. George Washington's Secret Navy: How the American Revolution Went
to Sea. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008.
James Nelson lends his lively writing style to a study of the naval activity during
the Siege of Boston, when George Washington commissioned six schooners to
attack British shipping. Nelson argues that Washington's actions helped spur
privateer activity and encouraged the Continental Congress to establish the first
American navy. Nelson primarily builds his work out of correspondence between
Washington, his captains, and his prize agents. Nelson’s work provides a bevy of
information regarding Washington’s fleet, which I argue is an example of
privateering driven by the public good in my third chapter.
Patton, Robert H. Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the
American Revolution. New York: Random House, 2008.
Robert Patton provides one of the most recent works investigating privateering
during the American Revolution. He uses the phenomenon of privateering to paint
a portrait of the social and economic landscape of revolutionary America. Patriot
Pirates primarily follows a narrative structure, focusing in on a few key characters
including Nathanael Greene, Silas Deane, and William Bingham. Patton's work
expands the field of privateer studies to look at those merchants that invested in
privateers alongside the men that sailed on the ships themselves. Patriot Pirates is
one of the few full-length books written specifically on American Revolutionary
privateering, and is a cornerstone secondary source for the field of study.
Pennell, C. R., ed. Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader. New York: New York University
Press, 2001.
Pennell has compiled one of the most complete and diverse collection of essays
on piracy with "Bandits at Sea." Scholars provide their takes on piracy from a
number of perspectives, looking at macro-elements like how piracy fit into the
economic system of the Atlantic world and looking at micro-historical elements
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like the social elements on board pirate vessels. This volume breaks the romantic
notion of piracy and leads to points about the type of individuals that pirates were:
social bandits, renegades, egalitarians, or any number of characters. When taken
in full, this book serves to educate the scholar on the broader scope of piracy, and
allows me to compare that practice to privateering.
Phillipson, Nicholas. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2010.
With this biography Nicholas Phillipson, an emeritus professor at the University
of Edinburgh, offers a complete look at Adam Smith's life and philosophies.
Smith, known best for his work of political economy The Wealth of Nations, was
a major part of the Scottish Enlightenment, and worked closely with David Hume
and other moralists in the eighteenth century. Smith's work on political economy
engages a number of interesting ideas related to self-interest, commerce, and the
virtue of citizens, ideas that were closely related to republican thought of the
Revolutionary Period. Phillipson's biography offers me a way to engage with
Smith's ideas in my third chapter regarding privateering's role in republican
thought.
Rahe, Paul A. "Antiquity Surpassed: The Repudiation of Classical Republicanism." In
Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649-1776, edited by David
Wootton, 233-69. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.
Paul A. Rahe is a political historian specializing in ancient conceptions of
republicanism and virtue. With this chapter he takes his work into the early
modern era to show how republican thinkers in that period differed from their
ancient counterparts. Rahe primarily argues that ancient republicanism lacked the
ethical and moral components later infused into it by Enlightenment thinkers. Of
particular interest is Rahe's discussion of luxury, which many republicans saw as
the downfall of the Roman Republic. Other republicans like Montesquieu
disagreed, believing that commerce and luxury were not inherently corrupting
influences on a republic. Rahe's chapter enhances my discussion of republicanism
within the Revolution, into which I place the privateering phenomenon in Chapter
Three.
Rappleye, Charles. Sons of Providence: The Brown Brothers, the Slave Trade, and the
American Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006.
Noted Revolutionary War biography Charles Rappleye puts his efforts towards
the Brown family in this effort. He particularly emphasizes John and Nicholas's
connections to the slave trade during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and
Moses's strong ties to the abolitionist movement. Rappleye touches on
privateering during the war, and some of the profiteering done by the Brown
family, but most of his narrative looks at the Brown's trading activities with
molasses, smuggling, and in particular slave trading. I have cited Rappleye’s
biography in my discussions of Brown and his mercantile maritime activities, as
well as his involvement with the Gaspee attack in 1772.
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Rediker, Marcus. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates,
and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Marcus Rediker, currently a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, is one of the
premier scholars of the early modern Atlantic world, and this is one of his premier
books. "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea" investigates the sailors of the
Atlantic as a collective labor force, one that was caught in between the oftendictatorial captains and merchants in charge of their lives and the ferocious power
of the sea. It serves as a social history from the "history from below" school.
Rediker's idea is that the sailors developed a degree of unified class consciousness
and egalitarianism in response to the harsh conditions they faced on deck. His
ideas on collective action and sailor's identity is invaluable to the early modern
maritime scholar; however, his emphasis in the class identity of sailors is open for
debate. I personally disagree with Rediker on his ideas of class consciousness;
however, his argument that sailors used collective action to improve their lives is
crucial to understanding privateersmen in the Atlantic world.
Rediker, Marcus. "The Seaman as Pirate: Plunder and Social Banditry at Sea." In Bandits
at Sea: A Pirates Reader, edited by C. R. Pennell, 139-68. New York: New York
University Press, 2001.
Rediker provides a brief selection for Pennell's anthology regarding his views on
class consciousness within pirate and privateer communities. He approaches
piracy from a social perspective, analyzing the way pirates related their own
experiences to wealthier merchants and elites. He concludes that pirates and
pirates communities were elements of resistance, a means to fight back against the
tyranny and oppression on board merchant trading vessels. I engage Rediker's
arguments throughout my work, but primarily in Chapter One, where I use his
work to support my arguments differentiating piracy from the more-regulated
practice of privateering.
Ritchie, Robert C. "Piracy." Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History. Edited by John B.
Hattendorf. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Accessed January 30, 2017.
https://goo.gl/n53uZE.
This article from Robert Ritchie serves as a useful introduction to the practice of
piracy. Ritchie encompasses the vast range of incidents that can be considered
piracy, getting at some of the scope of difficulty in conceptualizing the practice.
His account particularly gives a good narrative history from the Middle Ages
through the eighteenth century, as well as considering later, more minor breakouts
of piracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This article serves as a great
starting point for me to come to grips with piracy and understand its relationship
to privateering.
Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815.
New York: W.W. Norton, 2005.
N.A.M. Rodger, the foremost historian of the British Navy and professor at
Oxford University, offers a descriptive history of the navy from the seventeenth
into the nineteenth century in the first volume of his larger history. He splits up
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his chapters topically, taking one chapter to focus on administrative matters, then
operational affairs, then social histories; the book then flows roughly
chronologically, but not strictly so. Rodger's work is useful for me as I trace the
expansion of the Royal Navy and its primary role of protecting the overseas
possessions of the Empire and, more importantly, its role in protecting the
commercial maritime networks of that empire.
Rodger, N.A.M. The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy. London:
Collins, 1986.
N.A.M. Rodger is considered one of the top scholars of the Royal Navy. With
"The Wooden World" he provides a social history of the British Navy of the
eighteenth century. The book is organized topically, with such chapters as
"Health," "Discipline," and "Manning." His work provides the most complete
view of shipboard life during the eighteenth century. Rodger does however show
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was often tarred with the brush of piracy, it was far different than its illegal and
illegitimate counterpart. He goes on to describe how privateering's origins in
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institutions during the early modern era, such as its integral part in mercantile
investments and its usage by states during wartime. I have primarily used
Starkey's entry in my first chapter to provide a conceptualization of the practice of
privateering, and as an introduction to privateering's place in the early modern
state-mercantile system.
Starkey, David J. "'To Excite the Whole Company to Courage and Bravery': The
Incentivisation of British Privateering Crews, 1702-1815." In Naval Leadership
and Management: 1650 - 1950; Essays in Honour of Michael Duffy, edited by
Richard Harding and Helen Doe, 123-40. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012.
Accessed January 3, 2017. http://0www.jstor.org.dewey2.library.denison.edu/stable/10.7722/j.ctt81r96.15.
University of Hull Professor David Starkey takes a unique approach to
privateering in this chapter, looking beyond the strategic and economic
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